Well, if Jim Lobe’s latest piece over IPS is anything to believe, and I’m not entirely sure it is, one might expect the “hardline” Bush administration to get a whole lot harder on North Korea. I mean, you got everyone involved in this plot — William Kristol, Big Nick Eberstadt, Dick Cheney, John “Human Scum” Bolton, Shintaro “Fight the Man” Ishihara, Shinzo Abe, the Project for the New American Century, the New York Times… no mention of the Knights Templar or Illuminati, but I’m sure they’re connected, too. Anyway, the neocons seem to be wheeling out the big guns, and aiming them directly at Pyongyang:
That the hawks back in Washington are indeed mobilising became clear Monday when William Kristol, an influential neo-conservative who also chairs the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), faxed a statement entitled ‘Toward Regime Change in North Korea’ to reporters and various ”opinion leaders” in the capital.
PNAC, which boasts Vice President Dick Cheney, Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Cheney’s powerful chief of staff, I Lewis Libby — among a dozen other senior Bush national-security officials — as signers of its 1997 charter, issues statements relatively infrequently.
”It’s clear that they see the transition (between the Bush administration’s two terms) and before any new round of the Six-Party Talks — as the time to try to set policy direction”, one veteran analyst told IPS on Monday.
Kristol’s statement referred in particular to two recent articles, including one published last week by Nicholas Eberstadt, a Korea specialist at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), which appeared in the neo-conservative ‘The Weekly Standard’, which is edited by Kristol.
And I’ll tell you, Big Nick’s Weekly Standard piece is a beaut — as always, I generally agree with most of what Eberstadt has to say, but this time around, he presents his ideas in such an over-the-top fashion than, frankly, it scared the bejesus out of me. I also believe Big Nick made the classic U.S. pundit mistake of viewing South Korean domestic politics threw the prism of Korea-U.S. relations, which doesn’t give you even the remotest picture of political phenomena south of the DMZ. That being said, it really is a MUST READ, as it may very well be the stuff the North Korea policy of Bush’s second term is made of. To sum up Eberstadt’s six-point strategy:
– Instituting regime change–at the State Department: Purge the State Department! Throw all those “engagement” bums on the street!
– Defining “success” and “failure” for North Korea negotiations: Define clearly what constitutes success, and when the six party talks fail — and they will — don’t be afraid to call a spade a spade.
– Increasing China’s “ownership” of the North Korean problem: Beijing needs to know that when Pyongyang goes nuclear, the biggest bite of the shitburger is reserved for China. Time to stop hedging its bets.
– Working around the pro-appeasement crowd in the South Korean government: Screw the kimchi-eating surrender monkeys in Seoul — go straight to the South Korean people! Or, as he put it:
Instead of appeasing South Korea’s appeasers (as our policy to date has attempted to do, albeit clumsily) America should be speaking over their heads directly to the Korean people, building and nurturing the coalitions in South Korean domestic politics that will ultimately bring a prodigal ally back into the fold.
Actually, I believe this was the weakest of his six points, because judging from what he said, it becomes clear he doesn’t really know a whole lot about domestic South Korean politics, e.g., why the “coalitions” that might bring the “prodigal ally” back into the fold find themselves as the minority party. Even if the GNP does retake power, it’s unlikely to do so preaching a hardline against North Korea. The issues here are not incompetent, reflexively anti-American leaders — they just make the situation worse. The real issue is interest divergence, and “going straight to the people” is unlikely to change that.
– Readying the nondiplomatic instruments for North Korea threat reduction: When diplomacy fails, you need a plan B. Great idea, just as long as you don’t tell President Roh.
– Planning for a post-Communist Korean peninsula: As Eberstadt puts it:
For far too long, policymakers in the United States and elsewhere have acted as if contemplating the practical implications of the Kim Jong Il regime’s demise were somehow “thinking the unthinkable.” Instead, American policy should be actively engaged in planning for a successful transition to a post-Kim Jong Il Korea–and in coordinating with allies and other interested parties to maximize the opportunities and minimize the risks in that delicate and potentially dangerous process.
Anyway, read the piece in full on your own.
Back to William Kristol, the second article mentioned in his statement was the NYT piece I discussed last night:
The second article, published Sunday in the ‘New York Times’, detailed a number of recent indications cited by right-wing officials and the press in Japan — including high-level defections and the reported circulation of anti-government pamphlets — that Kim’s hold on power may be slipping.
The article noted in particular a recent statement by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Shinzo Abe, that ”regime change” was a distinct possibility and that ”we need to start simulations of what we should do at that time”.
”Recent reports suggest the presence of emerging cracks in the Stalinist power structure of North Korea, and even the emergence of serious dissident activity there”, wrote Kristol. ”This should remind us that one of President Bush’s top priorities in his second term will have to be dealing with this wretch(ed) regime”, he went on, citing Eberstadt’s strategy as ”useful guidance for an improved North Korean policy”.
I think I explained in last night’s post (and ones before it) why relying on defector testimony relayed to the West by the Sankei Shimbun or Chosun Ilbo (which often cites the Sankei on pieces related to North Korea) to formulate policy is a risky proposition indeed. That’s not to say I don’t hope the stories are true. I certainly hope they are. One prays, however, that the government doesn’t base policy on them unless it has compelling information other than what it reads in the Japanese and Korean press that indicates it should.
Now, as I pointed out earlier, Eberstadt’s thesis above may very well serve as the guidelines for Bush’s North Korea policy in his second term. Especially if John Bolton has his way:
Eberstadt’s strategy, according to a number of analysts, largely echoes the views of Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, a former AEI vice president who is openly campaigning to become deputy secretary of state under Condoleezza Rice.
Bolton, perhaps the administration’s most extreme hard-liner, has strong support in Cheney’s office and other right-wing strongholds, including ‘The Weekly Standard’ and on the editorial page of the ‘Wall Street Journal’.
On Saturday, right-wing Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, who claims to be on friendly terms with Bolton [The Ish? Bolton? Friends?], told Fuji Television that Bolton wants to impose economic sanctions against North Korea, which, in the U.S. official’s view, would lead to Kim’s ouster ”within one year”.
Well, i guess having Kim the Younger out in a year would be a positive development, as long he doesn’t elect to react with something along the lines of this.
25 Comments
I read Eberstadt’s article last night. Thinking of your probable reaction, I winced when I read “..America should be speaking over their heads directly to the Korean people…”
Glad I didn’t waste time emailing you with the link to it. Congrats — even though I don’t make any attempt to study and take notes to pass an exam, reading this blog has trained this non-Korean non-expat non visitor well enough to see the weaknesses in these “America first” type arguements.
The way to force movement in the increasingly precarious situation is to announce US intention to withdraw all ground troops by a certain deadline — say three years. If ROK wants to replace the two US MLRS battalions and the Apache Attack helicopters with equivalent forces of their own, that should give them sufficient time. If necessary we give them the stuff outright, once their troops are trained up in how to use it. Call it “Koreanization” — equivalent to “Vietnamization’ or “Iraqization”.
I think that’s the way to show China (& the other members of the “six parties”) that the US is not interested in a preemptive attack on NorK, and the certainty of impending withdrawl will force China to take more decisive action as regards their “client’s” nuclear status.
RE: “Big Nick made the classic U.S. pundit mistake of viewing South Korean domestic politics threw the prism of Korea-U.S. relations, which doesn?€™t give you even the remotest picture of political phenomena south of the DMZ.”
Very much agreed. It would serve him well to ask himself why the supposedly more pro-American types ruled for 50 years only to lose two presidential elections. Sometimes I think he should stick to crunching numbers on the NK economy, but then I still agree with much this time around, especially this part:After nearly four years in office, the curious fact remains that the Bush administration plainly lacks a strategy for dealing with the North Korean regime. It’s one thing to criticize the Clinton Administration’s approach as a failure, but you should be able to do better in four years or give reason to think you will in the next four. Fortunately, the Bush Administration does seem to be ready to give the North more attention.
About “America should be speaking over their heads directly to the Korean people.” I think the Korean public is running out of patience with NK. The novelty of reconciliation and increased exchange is wearing out, and if NK doesn’t do something tangible at this point I think more SK citizens are going to get disgusted with it.
I’m all for toppling North Korea. Where do I sign up?
Paul H. if the US withdraws, NK will take that privately as a victory while publicly they will say the US is moving troops out in order to prepare an air war or invasion or nuclear strike against NK. Remember the huge base in Okinawa…
Oranckay, I agree that this article makes me feel that though some of these guys are highyl intelligent, they really dont know what theyre talking about sometimes. And by sometimes, I mean disturbingly often. US policy shouldnt be made by ppl like that. I also agree that the SK is running out of patience with NK. Is there any way the US can speed that up???
“…publicly they [Nork] will say the US is moving troops out in order to prepare an air war or invasion or nuclear strike against NK….”
NorK says the US “…[will] prepare an air war or invasion or nuclear strike against NK…” regardless of what the US does.
“…if the US withdraws, NK will take that privately as a victory…”
They won their “victory” when the US and South Korea acquiesced in their acquisition of nuclear weapons. Probably such acquisition was inevitable, but when South Korean administrations deliberately chose to follow a “sunshine” policy of bribery of the North and “triangulation” between the North and the US, they lost average US citizens like me — ones who had held a lifelong feeling of trust and friendship towards South Korea.
I consider myself a canary in the coal mine as regards US popular opinion, not that I expect anyone is paying attention. But if South Koreans care at all how they are perceived in the US by ordinary US citizens, then they ought to be alarmed. I think the anti-US rhetoric and demonstrations, culminating in the election of the current ROK administration, has had a devastating impact on those here in the US who follow events in Korea.
In the event of a crisis I think the current ROK administration (and a large portion of their constituents) would see the US as more of a threat than NorK. So what exactly are we doing there?
The same dynamic is shaping up with our NATO “allies” as regards the imminent deployment of nuclear weapons by Iran.
We’re already decisively engaged in the Mideast. I frankly don’t think we have the national stength and will to confront two rogue nuclear states simultaneously, and we’ve about done all we can do for ROK. I don’t see us as required to play “elder brother” any longer, especially when the “younger brother” kicks us in the shins every time he feels the need to impress the local bully.
Paul,
I hear you; & it is precisely the prospect of losing well-informed friends of South Korea such as yourself that I fear most.
But my point is that the current spate of anti-Americanism in South Korea is neither deep-seated nor irreversible. It is a product of elite manipulation & as such can be easily undone by a similar act.
Didn’t have time to read all the links —- I’ll pretty much be stating “didn’t have time to….” from now on —-
But, one thing to keep in mind in US dimplomacy on North Korea these next few months…..
We will have to seperate the bluster from the reality - or try to.
Remember, I still believe it is complete hogwash Bill Clinton was “just about” to drop bombs on the North back in 1993. I’m sure “steps were taken” that lead in that direction and I know there was a bunch of talk about it…..but I was not suprised at all a “last minute” effort was made with Cater to cut a deal…..
Also, remember I agreed with both some dem and rep politicians and analysts who said Bush was “stupid” for quickly, publically stating use of force was off the table when the North’s nuclear story first broke the news in 2002.
I don’t believe the US will pull the trigger on North Korea unless it is caught red handed selling nuclear material abroad or they start shooting off ICBMs again to test if they have the capability to hit Hawaii or Alaska or the West Coast with the nuclear weapons we now believe they have.
But………as Kissinger said about the massive US response to the ax murders……it is a good idea to make North Korea believe we might be crazy enough to pull the trigger earlier.
In short……….I would not be surprised if the Bush administration starts putting out much tougher talk with all that is going on in US politics
Pete, having read your blog for a while and considering the depth of your knowledge about Korea, how in hell can you keep a straight face while deluding yourself with notions such as:
[I think the Korean public is running out of patience with NK. The novelty of reconciliation and increased exchange is wearing out, and if NK doesn?€™t do something tangible at this point I think more SK citizens are going to get disgusted with it.]
Do you honestly believe that South Koreans are capable of running out of patience with those sharing their genuinely unique BLOOD? Since when has the SK public or government for that matter, EVER demanded anything tangible from their brothers up North? Ever?
What signs would you point to to back up this assertion of patience wearing thin? Was the Universiade fiasco last year a sign of the novelty of exchanges wearing out? Because from where I sit, if the novelty of exchanges were anywhere near wearing out, you wouldn’t have seen the Nork cheerleaders treated like rock stars. You wouldn’t have seen attendance at the Nork teams events skyrocket in comparison to all others. You also wouldn’t have seen SK officials begging and groveling when the Norks threatened to withdraw, nor would you have seen SK load the Nork planes with millions in gifts as they departed.
Would you consider the complete and utter lack of public outrage over the 2000 summit payola ($500 mil aint small beans) scandal a sign of increasing disgust? Seems to me that those involved got off lightly with nary a peep from the public. Wouldn’t you say that the SK public was generally supportive of that $500 mil bribe after the fact? I would.
Given all the polls showing that most South Koreans consider the US a bigger threat than NK. Given the fact that in virtually every cultural, sporting, and economic “exchange” of the last 10 years, the South has literally bent over and willingly taken it in the shorts to accomodate their blood brothers without a single complaint or demand for anything tangible in return. Given the fact that the SK public and private sector are both pouring billions into the North in the name of economic development (with full on support from the general public), all the while knowing full well that it’s a black hole and they’re never going to see a dime in return. Given all that, how can you or anyone else honestly believe that the SK public is anywhere near reaching a point of patience running out or approaching a level of disgust with their brothers?
You can’t be serious. Seriously. Show me Pete. With the exception of a few Korean war vets burning Nork flags, what signs would you point to from SK citizens that could be construed as increasingly hostile towards NK?
I think Korea is safe from US backlash against anti-Americanism. The US just doesnt care about Korea.
However, there may be an attitude shift one day that says “Gee all those foreigners hate us for no reason, and the ones that hate us the most are the ones we have done the most for - France, Turkey, South Korea, Mexico, etc … lets bring the troops home and swear never to help out again”
Maybe that sounds ridiculous now, but I definately believe it is possible for the US to get sick of the baseless anti-Americanism.
Sorry Pdidlee, I have to agree with Oranckay that South Koreans are running out of patience with the North…a sign I could point to would be the absymally low poll numbers of the ruling Uri’s who invest the most capital in pro-North cheerleading, the same party’s drubbing in the last round of by-elections, and the announcement last week of a “Liberal Party” which is to be the opposite of what it’s name would suggest to Americans, that is, a right-wing party.
“Since when has the SK public or government for that matter, EVER demanded anything tangible from their brothers up North? Ever?” - Ok, well, Pres Kim YoungSam 92-97′, Chun DoHwan 80-88, Park ChunHee, 63-79. All these leaders demanded various things from the north and got tough when the North wouldn’t comply. Your post seems to imply that the South is incapable of hardball negotiation with the North…in fact, the last 7 years of submissive South Korean behavior is out of character for the South (I think).
And, my gut feeling living and talking with Koreans is that they are getting ever more cynical about the north. Yes, they get pissed at the Americans. I’m arguing, you underestimate them - it is quite possible for them to be fed up with both the North and the States at the same time. Anecdotally, the lack of a return visit by KimJongIl is pissing them off…it is often the small symbolic pride things like this or a short-track event that burns them the most.
Anybody notice the increasing shrillness and ever more daring pro-North BS coming from UriDang these days? Look at this not as evidence of increasing alignment with the north necessarily, but maybe as the desperation as a pro-North party sensing the ship sinking
“EVER demanded anything tangible from their brothers up North? Ever?”
hmm… 10 years ago, the South was just coming out of a nuclear crisis with the North. Back then, the South was trying to muster all the foreign diplomatic power to isolate North Korea. That was under the Kim Yong Sam administration. Things went 90 degrees left, when KDJ went to that 2000 NK summit. That’s when the main stream public love of NK began. So really, what you’re talking about, has been going on for the last 4 years - hardly long enough to what I call “EVER”.
to Pdidlee’s “EVER demanded anything tangible from their brothers up North? Ever?”
Didn’t say such, but I do expect people to put up with less crap even if I can’t tell you what that means. SK might not “get” anything from NK, but it might start getting harder to keep on “giving.”
Earlier this year the Hankyoreh ran a first page opinion piece criticizing NK for halting talks and tours at the slightest displeasure, and said NK would have to be more mature and predictable if relations are going to improve substantially. I just tried to find that article but given the subject it’s no an easy one to search for and I have a life. But surely, any consistent observer of Korean affairs would notice such things so maybe someone else has seen stuff similar.
It is of course rare for the Hankyoreh to get that serious with NK but it does hint that NK has missed chances and played its cards the wrong way in two recent editorials, which are in English. http://www.hani.co.kr/section-.....16001.html
We again call on North Korea to come to the six-party talks and make the right decision. Four years ago, during the Clinton Administration, the North came very close to establishing diplomatic relations with the US after Vice Marshall Cho Myong Nok and US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright exchanged visits to Washington and Pyongyang, but then the North lost a golden opportunity when it failed to make a final decision. It missed its chance and the situation has since worsened to become the source of the crisis on the Korean peninsula today. It must not make the same mistake this time. It is highly likely that the second Bush Administration will be filled with individuals who take a hardline stance on North Korea, and if there is not progress at the six-party talks they will clearly argue that “surely enough dialogue doesn’t work” and that therefore “all that’s left available is pressure and a blockade.” The North must act wisely and not give the hardliners in the US any excuses.
and this
http://www.hani.co.kr/section-.....45001.html
The North needs to stay aware of the subtle developments. Even if it thinks the situation unsatisfactory it should try to find a reason to come to the table and engage in substantial negotiations. It needs to take a cold look at how old brinkmanship would be too risky, and international conditions would not tolerate such tactics.
Not much, but any such stuff from Hankyoreh can be encouraging, and you can be safe that the less Hankyorehlike a Korean’s thinking is, the more he would be saying such things.
I see the change already, in little ways. I really do think people are losing patience and that the novelty of slightly better relations is wearing off. I’d like to think my instinct with these things is usually right, but only time will tell. Whatever the case, pls understand that I’m not suggesting people will ever expect big things from NK.
“said NK would have to be more mature and predictable if relations are going to improve substantially.”
That sounds like Noh Muh Hyun couple of days ago who called for a “more sincere attitude” from North Korea.
That one and the speech in LA, really has stirred up a storm of controversy and criticisms at home.
I don’t like the guy, he’s got a big mouth, and I think he’s directing the country in the wrong direction, but I think he honestly thinks he is doing good and I really think he means well.
I say it’s how you look at this thing. Is the cup half full or half empty? Twenty percent of South Koreans in a recent poll says the United States is the main enemy of South Korea. True, terrible numbers. On the other hand, 40% of South Koreans still consider North Korea as the main enemy, while the other 40% are confused fence sitters. That’s got to count for something. This is at a time when the relationship between ROK and the US is at an all time low. What does this poll and the poll that puts Noh Muh Hyun’s approval ratings somewhere around 20%, tell us? Won Jae Choe is correct, public opinions about North Korea and the United States are not irreversible. What should be encouraging to the real Korea watchers is the good healthy amount of debate that is currently going on in Korea. Just go to any of the substantial number of Korean http://WWW. BBS sites and you will get a sense of violent disagreements on the internet in Korea.
There is no one voice (pro-North, anti-American) coming out of South Korea.
Furthermore, I just want to add that we’ve had 4 years of “let’s give peace a chance” crowd to stir the boat. If the positive results aren’t forthcoming soon by the next elections, there is no guarantee that South Korea will not vote in a conservative government who will probably declare the Sun Shine Policy a failure.
Waves. It has been pretty clear sailing of late.
There has been no outrageous big wave of Anti-Americanism for awhile. Who knows when the next one will be? Those polls and feelings towards America could change in a matter of days if SK feels the US somehow slighted them in a sporting event.
Yes for now some South Koreans are getting tired of North Korea’s games but it won’t take much to get many to fall in love with their brothers all over again. NK has given nothing to SK and they have had few cultural exchanges lately. Just imagine how happy SK would be if SK and NK participated in the world cup or some other major event as one team. NK could bring their pure and beautiful cheerleaders, SK could pay billions of dirty dollars to NK, and SK would fall in love with NK all over again. Ah how easy it is.
Chung the URI unification minister and hopeful presidential candidate is desperate to see progress in relations with NK and is going to get played big time by NK. He will give anything for progress. NK knows this and Chung will give until it hurts (I mean really hurts) for any signs of progress. NK is waiting for the big payoff not some nickel and dime stuff.
I think its very possible that South Koreans will get “tired” of the way engagement is being run now, i.e., DJ’s “delayed reciprocity,” which in actual fact is no reciprocity at all. I don’t have any poll data on me right now, but I’d imagine most Koreans realize something isn’t quite right with the way North Korea policy is being conducted, although I’d imagine a great number also believe Sunshine’s failures are in large part due to Washington “hindering” intra-Korean relations. That being said, even the GNP has reluctantly embraced the idea of intra-Korean dialogue, with Park Geun-hye herself saying she’d go to Pyongyang. The fact is that South Korea has different interests than the U.S. does, namely, proliferation isn’t quite as high on Seoul’s list of priorities as it is on Washington’s, and North Korean nukes don’t really frighten people as much when Seoul is going to get hammered if a war breaks out regardless of whether Pyongyang has nukes or not. What I believe this translates into is that while the Korean electorate might vote in a gov’t that’s opposed to getting outright screwed by the North, it’s unlike to vote in people who would take a “hardline” against the North in the American sense. I hate to bring up that survey, but nearly half of Koreans would support the US in a war with North Korea, and you’d have to believe many if not most of the undecided would break the US way once the balloon went up. But that question was predicated on the condition that a clash had already begun, in which case the average person is going to want to back the winner, especially if it means unification in the end. That being said, how many of those people would actually want to create conditions that would make the conflict come closer to becoming a reality? Not many, I’d imagine.
“That being said, how many of those people would actually want to create conditions that would make the conflict come closer to becoming a reality?”
And it’s those same group of people who fear that creating those conditions to make the conflict come closer to reality, will create another war in Korea. It’s times like these when you need a strong capable leadership that would steer those people to do what must be done. Much like what Winston Churchill did during WWII, with that famous speech “we have nothing to fear but fear itself”. South Korea doesn’t have that kind of leadership unfortunately, thus the utter confusion that you see today.
I agree with you for the most part here, kimbob, in the sense that if Seoul continues to bankroll North Korea, Pyongyang is going to be less inclined to cutting a deal with Washington over the nukes, in which case, you’re right, that does make a war more likely to happen. What I’m still wondering, however, is if the U.S. puts on the pressure not so much with the aim of getting a deal on the nukes, but with the intention of bringing down the North Korean regime. As Nick Eberstadt pointed out, the nukes and the regime are one and the same. ???????¶???´. If this is the assumption Washington is operating under, Seoul’s North Korea policy won’t have the slightest effect on the outcome of the situation. Frankly, I’m still trying to figure out what I think about this. Big Nick might be right — North Korea may need an external crisis to keep the nation at a 24/7 war footing so as to justify the material deprivations the North Korean people must endure under a regime incapable of making basic socio-economic changes. Unfortunate, but quite possible true. But if this is the case, it makes co-existence very, very difficult, because the key to making such a system work is to provoke one crisis after the other without provoking the BIG ONE that prompts the other guys to invade. Needless to say, this makes life very hard on its neighbors, and you never know when it’ll misjudge in a way that cannot be ignored.
After reading the last few posts, it occurs to me that I ought to state one of my standard assumptions, which is that the capacity of the North Korean regime and its people to continue to endure at current bare subsistence levels is practically limitless.
It appears that as long as they actually don’t start a war they are guaranteed to get enough foodstuffs and supplies from various members of “the six parties” to keep the mass of their people minimally productive, while they gather in enough foreign exchange from their various “export” activities to sustain the party elites and the military/nuclear program in a manner sufficient to ensure their continued support.
Talk by learned Washington types about regime change seems laughable absent a serious effort to cut off this support (or force the Chinese to assume the entire burden of it). I’ve read what I can in English about DPRK (and I’ve seen some TV documentaries here in the US — one of the Discovery channels, on high number cable, has done some detailed (and horrifying) documentaries on NorK, using smuggled video and interviews with NorK defectors).
From what I can see NorK seems still to be totally oppressed in a Stalinist grip of steel (Stalin died in his bed, remember); any hope of internal change assuming the continued “status quo”, must be at least a decade away.
As long as we & Japan & ROK (Russia too?) ship immense quantities of food in, they will be able to keep going. The fact that we weren’t even serious enough to keep that cargo of NorK Scud missiles destined for Yemen (when the Spanish Navy stopped it, prior to Gulf War II) means that we are far from being serious about “regime change” and that any talk of this is so much rhetoric.
A serious effort at regime change would involve a cut off of supplies from US/ROK/Japan, and a sea blockade of NorK “contraband” exports (is there anything NorK exports which is “legal”, ie not drugs or missiles & missile components?)
This would force China to assume total support or acquiese in the fall of the regime. Of course any serious attempt to implement this would bring about mass hysteria in ROK, which is why I think it is never going to happen (and why articles like Eberstadt’s are just so many words).
Therefore it seems logical to me to wash our hands of the matter. Perhaps a US withdrawl would end up helping matters as NorK and ROK draw closer together — short of outright war, I don’t see how things can get any worse. I think NorK will continue to assemble nukes and upgrade its military as it resources permit, and that the ROK will not be willing to do anything about this but wring its hands while keeping up the flow of supplies and money.
Why not be honest with ourselves & the ROK and just acknowledge this? Nothing seems more futile and tiresome than blustering about “regime change” — ROK is not interested.
Asia by Blog
Asia by Blog is a twice weekly feature, posted on Monday and Thursday, providing links to Asian blogs and their views on the news in this fascinating region. Previous editions can be found here. This edition contains HK’s ripoff Disneyland, potential …
Can’t we simply fail to bail Kim out? That regimes been begging to collapse for some time now, propped up only by international aid. Why not just find other uses for the money?
Where is Paul’s Blog? Can someone refer me to the URL? Thanks.
The Neocons And North Korea
The Marmot analyses a Weekly Standard piece that purports to read the neocon tea leaves, and see an imposed regime change in Korea’s near future……
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