It’s very very hard to predict how the next Korean War would play out: there are an incredible number of wildcards (North Korean WMD, the PRC, loyalty of Koreans on both sides, American distractions, etc). I also caution anyone from extrapolating excessively from recent US wars, which have mostly been highly one-sided affairs between the most powerful military in history and deteriorating Third World conscript forces. Despite its wealth and technology, the ROK is not the USA, and lacks the operational training, etc, of American forces. And yes it’s a conscript army, though most conscript armies fight hard to defend their homelands. And despite decades of poverty, the North Korean military, I would wager, is still able to field the greater portion of its divisions and (obsolescent) equipment. In some ways the very backwardness of most North Korean kit is an advantage in this respect (easier maintenance with less reliance on undependable foreign support). Initially the North Koreans don’t have far to go anyhow (though sustaining such an offensive beyond a few weeks would probably exhaust them). Nor would air superiority (whether ROK or US) be as decisive in Korea as it has proven in the flat deserts of the Gulf (see, for instance, Nato airpower’s mixed results against Serbian forces in hilly, wooded, and urban Kosovo).

The next Korean War would prove both old-fashioned (lots of heavy slogging between huge infantry forces, massed artillery, etc) and something completely new (no large-scale mechanised war has ever been fought in densely urbanised First World terrain with modern technology). The North Koreans would probably have a certain level of tactical surprise in an invasion (especially if America is not assisting the ROK), and the effects of their initial bombardment (and SOF incursions) on Seoul and ROK military bases would be like nothing experienced in most of our lifetimes. -Remember-: no First World military has come under sustained heavy massed conventional firepower (ie huge artillery barrages) since probably the last Korean War (though Israeli units may have experienced such in limited quantities during their conventional wars). It’s not clear how well First World reliance on advanced communications, logistics, etc, would fare in such an environment. And that’s leaving aside the chaos of millions of fleeing civilians, etc.

It is exceedingly foolish (and lazy) to assume that economic power always translates into military power. Economic superiority -eventually- can translate into military victory, but often countries don’t have that time. Western Europe and much of the Soviet Union fell to Nazi Germany in very quick offensives, in which the greater economic potential of the Allies initially could play no role (you have to buy tanks -today- to fight -tomorrow-; tomorrow’s tanks might be too late). Finally, morale and training count for much in war, and it’s difficult to make definitive judgements about either Korean military in the current political and cultural climate. I will point out, though the ROK army is very good, especially for its size, it is still a conscript army, and it’s rather daft to claim it is ‘number 4′, at least based on the quality of its soldiers. Though much smaller, the Anglo-Saxon armies outside the US (ie UK, Canada, Australia, etc) all field superb troops, man for man, as does the traditionally professional (and Colonial) component of the French military (eg the Legion Etrangere). And then there’s Israel, which I must believe is still one of the most effective Western militaries, despite the declines documented by Van Creveld et al.

If you’re curious, please take a look at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/.....crisis.htm

…especially the details of OPLAN 5027.

Yours, M

Bullshit.

By that same reasoning, China can be said to be Mongol land, or even Manchu land, and parts of China of course would rightfully belong to Portugal and Great Britain. and hey, why not turn over part of the country to Japan and Korea. They both took their own turns ruling over the Han people.

Whatcha gonna do?

Historical possession, tradition, or even current demographics don’t mean anything. It’s the same reason Korea should be careful about making claims to Gando.

There’s more to the subject of “our history” than possession hundreds of years ago.