http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/S.....300012.asp

One of his most interesting points made by Park is that this Goguryeo issue “has exposed the hypocritical nature of North Korea’s nationalism.”

I have been thinking the same thing myself. Over breakfast a few days ago, my wife and I were discussing this, and I remarked, “Kim Jong Il may turn out to be Korean nationalism’s greatest traitor if he allows North Korea to fall to China. If he were really such a great nationalist, he’d be putting as much distance as possible between his regime and China.”

Instead, they’ve maintained a studied silence over this for several months now (after initially protesting back in January or February, if I recall).

Anyway, read the article.

Jeffery Hodges

“Isn’t the President Concerned about a Pro-Chinese Puppet Regime in Pyongyang?” (http://english.chosun.com/w21d.....70060.html).

In the article, this point was made:

“Whatever happens in North Korea, South Korea has no right to unilaterally intervene in terms of international law. Our constitutional provision that the North Korean people and territory belong to the Republic of Korea has only the effect of domestic law.”

By the same token, China would surely have no right to unilaterally intervene. My understanding is that control would revert to the United Nations, possibly to the United Nations Unified Command Korea. Would that mean to the U.S. by default? Does anybody know the details of this legal situation?

Concerning another statement:

“Former Prime Minister Goh Kun has revealed . . . . a judgment that if the Kim Jong-il regime suddenly collapses to create a power gap in the North, . . . under such a situation South Korea totally lacks a means of influencing North Korea.”

Perhaps the Sunshine Policy was more prescient than I had thought. Also the American deal with the North about supplying fuel if the North would stop its nuclear development. Both could have been used to make the North dependent upon the South and the U.S. and less dependent upon China, which currently supplies the North’s fuel.

If so, then the Kim Jong Il has perhaps blown a chance to distance his regime from China and escape from its powerful influence over the North. Or has he been calculating that a nuclear program would give him leverage not just against the South and the U.S. but also against China?

(Incidently, one way for Japan to mend its long-damaged relations with Korea would be for it to express unreserved support for a unified Korea in the event of a North Korean collapse.)

Jeffery Hodges

P.S. Why is the comments window so small? (Or is this just on my screen?) I find it impossible to have an overview of what I type because it disappears quickly as it scrolls up the screen.

The higest ranking North Korean defector warned that once China becomes powerful, it can cause a headache for people who want to democratize N.K. and unite two democratic Koreas into one. Seeing what’s going on, he seemed bloody prescient.

Some of the people who translate for Chosun Chinese live in Beijing and have never been to Seoul. I wonder what would happen to Chosun Chinese if authorities there ever figured that out.

I looked at the Chosun Ilbo article, “Koguryo Issue Can be Resolved: Chinese President,” by reporter Shin Jeong-rok. There, we find another “verbal message” from China, this one from Chinese President Hu Jintao.

“Hu said the Sino-Korean relationship had been influenced to some degree by the Koguryo issue …. [and] that both he and the Chinese government, with much interest in the Koguryo issue, … [were sending] a frank exchange of views on the issue with President Roh. Hu optimistically said the bilateral relationship could continue to develop in the right direction in a healthy and stable way. Hu pointed out that when Roh visited China last year, the two nations decided to pursue total bilateral cooperation, and the development of direction between the two nations grew clearer. Hu also said that it wasn’t easy for the Sino-Korean relationship to develop to the level it is at today, and both sides would have to maintain that relationship. Premised on this, Hu said he and his government were pursuing a policy of friendship toward Korea. He also expressed his respect for President Roh for the high opinion he has shown for the development of Sino-Korean ties. He continued on, calling on Korea and China to understand and respect one another, and to become good neighbors and partners that trust one another. He said he would tirelessly work so that prosperity between the two nations helps peace and prosperity in both the region and the world.”

President Hu’s subtext: China is the big power in this region, and Korea’s economic future depends upon close ties and good relations with China, so don’t make trouble over Goguryeo.

At least, it seems to me that this is the underlying message. It’s hard to be sure since the article is in English. The crucial expression is “frank exchange of views,” which is usually diplomatic code employed for characterizing an exchange of significantly differing views over a very important issue. What’s the Korean expression in the original article, and what are it’s nuances? Also, does anybody know the Chinese term here and its nuances?

But even if the diplomatic code is not being used, the subtext is still intended to remind Korea that it had better not embarass China by protesting too loudly about Goguryeo. I think this is what is meant by Hu’s message “that it wasn’t easy for the Sino-Korean relationship to develop to the level it is at today, and [that] both sides would have to maintain that relationship.” More concisely put: Good relations can quickly turn bad, so be careful.

The other article, “China’s Censorship of Koguryo History ‘Mistaken Approach’” by Bernard Rowan in The Korea Times, is also interesting. Rowan seems to have a good sense of the complexity of issues such as this one over Goguryeo, based on his comparative approach. Is he an expert on Korea? I did a Google search but couldn’t find his area of expertise other than that he has a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago.

Jeffery Hodges