The Korean press (and government) is gang-banging 8th U.S. Army commander Lt. Gen. Charles Campbell for comments he made to reporters Tuesday in which he suggested not only that USFK could be deployed outside of the Korean Peninsula, but that a combined ROK-US force could conduct humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Northeast Asia. The Flying Yangban and Budaechigae do a very good job of discussing the controversy over at their own blogs, and you’d do well to read what they have to say. I remember reading the Korean version of what the good general said in the Chosun Ilbo, and was like, “WTF?” I mean, first off, it seemed like Campbell was pushing the envelope of explaining existing policy and proposing a few of his own. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it’s one thing for a U.S. officer to talk about what he’ll do with U.S. troops under his command, but quite another to talk about what he’ll do with another country’s troops, especially if said country hasn’t exactly been brought into the loop yet. Hey, even if I happened to like some of what Campbell was suggesting — which I do, BTW — it would initially seem that what he said was out of line and requires, at the very least, clarification. The problem is, I haven’t actually seen a transcript of what the general said, and USFK apparently issued a statement that explained that Campbell wasn’t setting out policy directions but simply talking hypothetically. The Korean version of Campbell’s statement which I saw it today’s Chosun Ilbo’s editorial seemed to suggest that he was, in fact, speaking hypothetically. When I get my grubby little hands on the actual transcript, I’ll be able to judge better the context of what was said (like the Roh Rule, i.e., if it was in response to a reporter’s question, it’s O.K.) and whether there were mistranslations (also a possibility). Still, being the commander of the 8th U.S. Army, he should have guessed that a statement like the one he made would have ignited a policy debate within South Korea. The fact that both the Foreign and Defense ministries were quite taken back seems to suggest that this isn’t simply a case of Seoul keeping the voters in the dark. Heck, even the Chosun was ticked off, and as far as the media is concerned, the Chosun likes to think of itself as USFK’s best friend.
However, there were a couple of things said during the course of today’s fun that really disturbed me. Assuming Campbell really did stick his foot in his mouth, the South Korean government was fully justified in issuing protests. No problem there. However, the Chosun quotes a core government official as saying:
“From our position, because of China, peacekeeping activities in Northeast Asia and USFK serving as a mobile Northeast Asian strike force would be burdensome… We are now considering plans stipulating systemic provisions for the U.S. to deliberate with out government prior to sending USFK anywhere.”
Another official said:
USFK exists for defense on the Korean Peninsula, and while the North Korean nuclear crisis isn’t being resolved, how can one talk of changes in the character of USFK?
Now, that’s some disturbing stuff. My conviction that the Korea-U.S. alliance has a future is predicated on my belief that as Korean leaders discover that they run a country that does, in fact, have global interests, they will see those interests as coinciding with U.S. interests more often than not. If the Korea-U.S. alliance is one limited to security on the Korean Peninsula, I’m telling you right now, it has no future. Given the apparent divergence of interests between Washington and Seoul concerning the North Korean nuclear issue, I’m not even sure if the peninsular-bound alliance has a present. Even if the alliance survives the end of North Korea, what’s the point of keeping the alliance around once its raison d’etre passes? If the Koreans want no part of containing China, a U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula would seem like a waste. Moreover, if Seoul is intent on deferring to Beijing on regional issues, what’s the point in extending security guarantees to Korea? Not to make to fine a point of this, but what’s in it for the United States? We get to maintain bases in Korea that, more than likely, we wouldn’t be allowed to use in the event of an emergency along the Taiwan Straits or along the Sino-Russian frontier. We get to keep a potentially powerful U.S. ally in Japan in a state of semi-dependency while China and Korea work to weaken U.S. influence in East Asia and possibly subvert U.S. interests in the region. Now, I’m not saying that the U.S. and China are destined to clash, and I’m definitely not suggesting policies that would help such a clash happen. What concerns me, however, is that Seoul seems to have tipped its hand here by indicating that if the shit hit the fan, it wouldn’t want to get involved. Hey, that might be a smart play on Seoul’s part. I don’t think it is, but arguments could certainly be made in favor of it. If Korea doesn’t want define its alliance with the U.S. in a way that could possibly involve it in greater U.S. strategy in the region, however, that would limit the alliance in such a way that for Washington, it wouldn’t be worth the money and aggravation to maintain it. At that point, it would be better for Washington to seek out other partners that share its interests and concerns and in the region (while Seoul does the same).
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Another SK government official was quoted as saying, “We have no knowledge of future combined peacekeeiping operations with USFK in Northeast Asia. Our plan is to slowly disarm and allow our Dear Leader to unify the peninsula without firing a shot.”
Marmot, I’d be interested in seeing the transcript. Sounds to me like the CO’s statements went through two translations before they hit Page One.
There are three controversial statements. I think each deserves a separate analysis:
-”being able to insert USFK anywhere in the world”
USFK is an entirely American force, except for a handful of KATUSAs, who presumably stay in Korea if USFK goes. Campbell is really reminding Korea that they’re still our troops. What’s wrong with that? Yes, Korea can complain about the lack of advance consultation, but it looks like a clear shot across their bow given their recent behavior. I suspect this is a hint, not a gaffe.
-”having Korea-U.S. allied forces engage in international humanitarian operations” and “conducting peacekeeping missions in Northeast Asia”
Since neither of these contingencies has yet even taken place, it’s reasonable to assume that the U.S. and South Korea would have to agree on any specific joint deployment before it happens. Indeed, the “hypothetical” explanation makes sense to me. Campbell’s suggesting new ways the alliance can evolve to remain useful, but he isn’t claiming the unilateral right to deploy Korean troops.
Maybe I just don’t get it. I understand that Korea is panicky, but I see that as strictly a function of the fact that Korea likes having a unilaterally beneficial alliance. It considers all those AMERICAN soldiers in the USFK its own, no matter how much it hates each and every one of them. Who’s arrogant here?
I also suggest a reading of Kim Dae-Joong’s op-ed today, a real piece of work:
http://english.chosun.com/w21d.....50048.html
Kim is pretty forthright about his complete distaste for the American people, yet he can’t believe that the current government isn’t doing a good enough job in “taking advantage” of America. Translation–we hate you, but we like your money. That article pretty much sums up the way Korea sees us, and why Korea needs to move out of dad’s basement and pay its own rent.
I ripped Kim up for that slimy editorial. Thankfully, from the good number of long time Korean residents in the US I’ve run across, he is in the tiny minority that can write with a straight face, “The more we live here, the more we learn to hate this horrible nation.” I wonder why he doesn’t convert to radical Islam and blow up a few buildings?
Anyway, I haven’t read the stuff on the USFK guy’s comments. Whenever I hear them saying “NE Asia” I translate it to “the Middle East, I mean East or Asia, you know India and whatnot are considered Asia, right….”
I have always thought USFK and SK officials were full of bull when they said USFK would retain a role in Korea after unification.
Unless the North implodes and USFK is needed as a peacekeeping force up their to hold it together or to take the place of SK troops moved up there to keep the piece….
or unless SK convinces the US to use USFK to attack Japan…..
there is no way in this world SK is going to view a need to keep USFK and once that need factor is gone - they will fully exercise this strong base of anti-USFK feeling they have cultivated for some time now.
Waiting for that day will be one of the most stupid foreign policy decisions in US history….
I asked a few Korean journalists and (although some papers will now join the bandwagon) I’m convinced this was a Chosun Ilbo fuck-up - an overegging of Campbell’s carefully prefaced hypothetical remarks by an that the paper cannot now back down from. We can already see this being woven into their broader campaign to discredit the Roh government for mishandling the “alliance”.
(Although with “friends” like the Chosun’s Kim Dae-jung, why would the U.S. need enemies?)
Lest I seem to have abandoned all reason for vengeance, I see merit in keeping a small U.S. force in Korea. I think we should keep equipment pre-positioned in ships in Chinhae, Pusan, and/or Pohang, so that we do have the strategic option of reacting quickly should we choose to do so. I also favor keeping air and naval bases in the ROK, but with reduced manning until an urgent need arises. Although I think the liabilities of keeping ground forces in Korea vastly outnumber the benefits, since we have no stomach for a ground war in Asia (remember “The Princess Bride”), it could benefit the U.S. to be able to project air and naval power there. The ROKs can supply their own infantry.
I also see some benefit in keeping those forces there after NK implodes–China. China is a far greater threat in the long term than Korea, and keeping plenty of air power in the region is a great way to prevent China from concentrating all of its intimidating force against Japan or Taiwan–or even the ROK. Long-term, if the number of troops we keep there is small and our options remain visibly open, the South Koreans will be eager to keep some U.S. military presence and would therefore be a much more cooperative ally.
Marmot, some excellent observations in regards to the way the “alliance” with the USA and Korea is going. I doubt the Comrade Roh government will ever shake off the xenophobia that got it elected. Korea was historically a closed country and the doors are swinging shut like those on a barn in a hurricane.
Such talk was unthinkable only a short time ago. I am glad that it is happening now because there is no way any American taxpayer should ever for one second tolerate the way American soldiers are treated in Korea.
I personally am over joyed the “alliance” is rapidly ending because it will mean Korea has to stand on its own two feet and take responsibility for its actions and the consequences for them, too.
Maybe it’s time for Japan and South Korea to trade Constitutions.
I did a post on my blog on the Chosun thing. I think Roh, who just got back in power, told his people to find a way to express outrage at USFK changes, because he was losing public opinion for his gov and Uri Party basically ho-humming the removal of US troops from Korea and beyond that the move below the Han.
I also put on my blog a post on how the same thing happened with the land partnership plan which was in the news off and on for a couple of years before 2002 —- when the press and even the head of the Korean military expressed “shock” at hearing about it (again) during the tail end of the anti-US orgy —- as if the plan suddenly somehow became only linked to anti-Americanism in Korea and was NOT really a long negociated plan Korea knew all about.
(About Kim) I wonder why he doesn’t convert to radical Islam
No more soju, no more ??쩌?짼쨔??쨈. Tough.
PING:
TITLE: Eyes on Korea: 2004-06-11
BLOG NAME: Winds of Change.NET
South Korea-U.S. alliance in turmoil, China thows down the gauntlet, Pyongyang peddling uranium, John Kerry on North Korea, intra-Korean military talks, tiger traps, dumplings you wouldn’t want to eat and much, much more!
PING:
TITLE: Eyes on Korea: 2004-06-11
BLOG NAME: Winds of Change.NET
South Korea-U.S. alliance in turmoil, China thows down the gauntlet, Pyongyang peddling uranium, John Kerry on North Korea, intra-Korean military talks, tiger traps, dumplings you wouldn’t want to eat and much, much more!
PING:
TITLE: Eyes on Korea: 2004-06-11
BLOG NAME: Winds of Change.NET
South Korea-U.S. alliance in turmoil, China thows down the gauntlet, Pyongyang peddling uranium, John Kerry on North Korea, intra-Korean military talks, tiger traps, dumplings you wouldn’t want to eat and much, much more!
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