Over at Oxblog, David Adesnik recounts a conversation he recently had with Tufts University professor Sung-Yoon Lee concerning the North Korean nuclear program. It’s a long post, but interesting and well worth your time. Allow me to pick out some of the sections that struck me:
The analytical linchpin of Prof. Lee’s approach to North Korean behavior is his conclusion that the Pyongyang dictatorship considers the possession of nuclear weapons to be the only reliable guarantor of its existence. In the absence of a nuclear deterrent, it would only be a matter of time before the South Korean government destroyed its Northern counterpart by tempting its citizens with the prospect of prosperity and freedom Thus, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that Kim Jong Il will accept the verifiable dismantling of his nuclear program in exchange for economic aid, international legitimacy, a non-aggression pact with the United States or some combination of all three. Immoral or not, giving in to blackmail simply won’t work.
In other words, Prof. Lee vehemently disagrees with all those who believe that the United States can resolve its ongoing confrontation with North Korea by means of either bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Yet given that war is simply not an acceptable option, Prof. Lee has nothing against negotiation, since it can’t make matters worse and — given some extraordinary luck — may result in a lessening of tensions.
In assessing the state of US-North Korean relations, Prof. Lee believes that both the Bush administration and its critics make the categorical mistake of interpreting North Korean behavior as a response to American initiatives rather than the imperatives of North Korean domestic politics. Coming from this perspective, Prof. Lee tends to believe that the Bush administration has been beset by critics who offer unrealistic alternatives because of their naivete about North Korean politics. Thus, with regard to the Bush administration’s decision to confront the North Koreans in October 2002 with evidence of their illegal uranium enrichment program, Prof. Lee suggested that the temporary escalation of tensions was essentially insignificant given that North Korea constantly creates crises as a result of its own provocative behavior.
I couldn’t agree with Lee more that the North Korean nuclear program is linked more to North Korean decision making than it is to external factors like the “American threat” and that the crises Pyongyang starts play an important role politically within North Korea. What I don’t get, however, is why the North Koreans should think that the possession of a nuclear arsenal would substantially help the regime counter a South Korean threat that, as Lee puts it, is more cultural and economic than it is military. Personally, I always assumed that the North Koreans were building those things with the goal of obtaining hard currency — through blackmail — which in turn would allow the regime to survive without it having to make radical economic reforms that might topple it. A quite rational decision, really, but it assumes that others will do their part and pay up. Now, Seoul seems quite complacent to pay Pyongyang’s extortion, although in South Korea’s defense, it does have other agendas in mind when it sends cash, aid and investment up North. The big money, however, is in Washington and Tokyo, and both of them seem less than enthusiastic to pay blackmail to North Korea. Which means that unless the South (and/or China) is particularly generous, I can’t see Pyongyang turning a profit off what must have been an extremely expensive program. This is a problem, of course, because economic collapse is the single biggest threat to the stability of the North Korean regime, and unless it can convert its nukes into serious cash flow, the development of those warheads (and all the other things that come with them, like delivery systems) might constitute a bigger threat to Pyongyang than it does to anyone else. This is doubly the case if other states, like Japan and South Korea, responded to the North Korean nuclear threat by developing their own nuclear programs, in which case North Korea might be forced to develop credible deterrent capabilities to ward off a Japanese or South Korean first strike. Heck, as it stands now, an American first strike is a possibility North Korea’s nuclear planners have to contend with. Which means, of course, that North Korea’s possession of a nuclear arsenal would require Pyongyang to spend even more money and resources to protect it and make the threat it represents credible. That’s money and resources North Korea would have to divert from resurrecting its economy. I have no reason to believe that North Korea’s continued diversion of scarce economic resources to its military-industrial complex will yield better results than the same policies did for the Soviet Union. China, assuming that it’s not willing to risk a North Korean collapse, will be forced to throw more and more money down the drain that is North Korea, which — from a U.S. policy standpoint — might not be such a bad thing, as long as the costs of maintaining a perpetual pain-in-the-ass client state outweigh North Korea’s utility as a geopolitical tool in Chinese dealings with the United States.
About South Korea:
Turning southward, Prof. Lee expressed grave concerns about rising anti-American sentiment in South Korea. While describing himself as an ardent South Korean nationalist who puts the interests of his homeland above all else, Prof. Lee nonetheless argued that absolutely nothing is more critical to South Korean security than an unflinching American commitment to protect it from Northern aggression. Speaking historically, Prof. Lee observed that whereas Harry Truman went to war in 1950 in order to contain Communism and protect American interests, his decision had the unmistakable effect of liberating South Korea from Northern occupation and laying the foundations of the moderan South Korean state.
With no memories of the war to rely on, young South Koreans have forgotten the degree to which South Korean and American security are inextricably linked. Thus, young South Koreans’ passionate desire for reunification with the North leads them to indefensible conclusion (expressed via opinion polls) that it is the United States, rather than North Korea, that is preventing reunification. What young South Koreans do remember is that in 1980, South Korea’s military government slaughtered thousands of civilians in what became known as the Kwangju Massacre. While there is no question that the Carter administration supported the military government almost uncritically, many South Koreans believe that the United States actually played a direct role in the massacre, since the military government could not have transferred its soldiers from the northern border to the southern city of Kwangju without the direct authorization of hte United States.
In addition to his wariness of South Korean public opinion, Prof. Lee is fiercely critical of both the current administration of Roh Moo-Hyun as well as that of his predecessor Kim Dae Jung. One year ago, Prof. Lee wrote that:
“[South Korean] nationalism was a constructive force in resisting colonial oppression and in the staggering challenge of nation-building half a century ago. Today, in its virulent anti-US rhetoric and shockingly naive attachment to North Korea, it is simply self-defeating.”
One example of naivete that Prof. Lee mentioned was the Kim and Roh governments’ decision to all but abandon counter-espionage programs designed to protect the South from the vast network of covert operatives — numbering in the thousands — that North Korea continues to operate in the South. In fact, the North Korean commitment to espionage is so fanatical that drafts preadolescents into its espionage programs so that they can undergo decades of training and indoctrination before being deployed to the South.
Again, I share with Lee his negative view of the Kim and Roh administrations. It should be pointed out, however, that one of the reasons why counter-espionage programs were discontinued (an insane decision, granted) was the fact that the South’s counter-espionage programs were being used for more than catching North Korean spooks; it was used for eavesdropping on politicians, arranging shootouts and other incidents along the DMZ at election time, not to mention some uglier stuff in the 60s, 70s and 80s. But more importantly, his comments concerning “the degree to which South Korean and American security are inextricably linked” need elaboration. Actually, they need refutation. This is no longer the Cold War; the Americans no longer need South Korea, and South Korea no longer needs the United States. American and South Korean security are no longer inextricably linked, and at a number of points (the North Korean nuclear issue, for starters), their security goals may actually conflict. American security guarantees to South Korea — as they are currently structured — are no longer needed to ward off the North Korean threat and may complicate things if Washington chooses to pursue new strategic options in East Asia (like forging new relationships with either Japan or China). They also encourage South Korean politicians to take a rather naive view of security — which helps neither Seoul or Washington — and in a worse case scenario, may lead to U.S. forces becoming involved in a conflict it has no need to involve itself in. From South Korea’s perspective, too, the end of the Cold War and the nation’s transformation from a basketcase Cold War client of the United States into a powerful economic and military power in its own right has brought with it new geopolitical options. Seoul may choose to ally itself with Washington — that’s the choice I’d make — but unlike in the past, that’s no longer the only choice. For example, Seoul may decide that its economic and strategic interests dictate that it forge closer ties with China at the expense of its relationship with the United States. A re-militarized Japan or a rejuvenated Russia may present South Korea with other foreign policy options. For that matter, Korea may simply choose to develop its own military capabilities (something it’s fully capable of doing) and “go-it-alone.” The point here is that Korea has choices in terms of its foreign and security policies, as do the Americans, and the security of both nations is no longer inextricably linked. More than the generational split or Gwangju, it’s this geopolitical reality that is responsible for the changing U.S.-R.O.K. relationship.
(Via the Gweilo Diaries and the Infidel, who has a few things to say about this himself)
7 Comments
I’d like to say more about the US-NK confrontation, in the way of the history of this confrontation especially during the Clinton years (1993-2000. In my view, many of the people who sound off about the threat posed by NK whether on the BBC website or serious Korea blogs have little perspective on the issue because they know little of this history. In fact, in 1994, tensions were much greater than at any time since the Korean armistice or since. I recall story after story (not on the front page by the way) in the SF Chronicle, about the tense confrontation over NK nuclear development, reaching a fever pitch, very close to war in my view at the time. I wrote to Sen Boxer and Feinstein, something I rarely did before, because of my concerns. Then in August, Kim Il Sung, the long time (revered and adulated) leader and founder of NK died which temporarily broke the tension. For several months it was not clear who was in charge though many speculated his son Kim Jong Il would inherit the mantle of leader. But tension resumed that fall until Jimmy Carter made a dramatic trip to NK and somehow managed to persuade KJI to negotiate with Clinton over their differences. The details of how Carter managed to do this are still unclear but he had to persuade not only KJI, impossible as it may have been, but Clinton as well. Eventually, after years of negotiation they negotiated a satisfactory (until Bush) agreement called the Agreed Framework. The most important part of the AF was the part where NK agreed to halt plutonium reprocessing at their main reactor facility at Yongbyon. The IAEA was able to setup monitoring equipment at Yongbyon to insure that the AF worked to the satisfaction of Clinton. Later of course Bush discovered that KJI was cheating but not over the plutonium reprocessing. KJI was accused of starting work on uranium enrichment at another facility using equipment supplied by Pakistan (the notorious proliferator behind this transfer of equipment was AQ Khan the father of the Pakistani atomic bomb as we now know). To show that the AF was not entirely in vain despite Bush’s termination of it after the cheating incident just mentioned, we should mention the missile testing incident of August 1998. At that time, NK had launched a missile test of their long range Nodong missile which plopped down (off course) in the Pacific just beyond Japanese shores. This set off alarm bells internationally especially in Japan (not surprisingly). NK without apologizing tried to minimize the incident with the statement that it was an aborted attempt to launch a satellite. Regardless of how seriously this was believed, the favorable atmosphere created by the successful negotiations culminating in the AF (it was still in effect at the time), allowed both sides to resolve the tension over the missile test. NK has never tried to repeat the test since despite the worsened relations with the Bush administration. In summary, it is my contention that tensions today though far from good are nowhere near what they were in 1994 for those who remember that far back. There are many today who deplore the malfeasance, insincerity, and downright brutality and hatred of KJI and his military and would like to see the US get it over with before they get any further in their nuclear development program. My advice is to cool down, conditions can worsen but they can also become better because there is no easy way to predict the future about these matters. The fear and dislike of Moammar Khadafy was at one time as strong as that of KJI in the eighties and early nineties. Just review the history of the Pan Am 103 flight and trials not to mention Ronald Reagan’s attack on Libya in the eighties to verify this assessment of how history can change for the better without having to go to war against so called evil dictators. Have patience please. It is this typical American impatience that is by now obviously responsible for landing Bush in the Iraqi quagmire with no apparent way out in the forseeable future.
I believe you may have overlooked one possibility.
What if the US simply gave some short range nuclear weapons to Japan and South Korea? Neither country would then have to expend the vast amounts of money to create and deploy nuclear weapons. Both countries would then have a credible response to any NK threats - without having strained their economies. Check and mate!!!
Hi I just wanted to say that I read your blog frequently and I find it very informative. Keep up the great work and thanks.
My take on Prof Lee’s pessimism regarding the ineffectiveness of current six-power talks in resolving US-NK disputes. Don’t forget this is an election year in the US. Polls show GWB’s popularity continuing to sink. His Iraq policy is clearly passing through a turbulent period with no obvious relief in sight. Although job figures are much brighter the past month, many economists doubt the second half of the year will be better and may even turn out to be worse. The Democrats have united behind John Kerry and young people are volunteering in droves for voter registration campaigns. They know that this will be one of the most crucial elections in their lifetime. What does all this have to do with the US-NK future relationship? Plenty if you paid any attention to the long series of Democratic primary debates. Kerry said on the few occasions when the subject came up that he would seek to solidly back multilateral negotiations with other countries which is to say continue the six-power talks. This is consistent with his plans to end current unilaterlist (bilateralist if you include Blair as an equal with Bush) policy on Iraq. By contrast it is never clear whether Bush-Cheney takes the current six-power talks very seriously though they continue to participate in it. To summarize, it is worthwhile to continue the talks, with the hope that they could become a vehicle for serious negotiations between the US and NK, after (and if) Kerry wins it in November.
Jim — I was referring to North Korea as far as the straining was concerned. Of course, South Korea and Japan could develop their own nuclear programs with little or no damage to their economies.
Mr. Sato — I appreciate your comments, but their dead wrong in a number of places. First of all, Kerry has come out in favor of direct talks with North Korea. South Korea and China favor this, of course, because it takes the responsibility off of them. But that’s not multilateralism — that’s Seoul and Beijing supporting American unilateralism, especially when it’s unilateral appeasement.
Second, the Agreed Framework was hardly “satisfactory,” either before or after Bush. Clinton believed North Korea would collapse before he’d have to honor the agreement, and the North Koreans never had any intention of honoring it at all. The fact that the North Koreans got caught cheating with a uraninium — rather than plutonium — program makes no difference; the agreement was cross-referenced to the 1991 denuclearization agreement. Anyway, to make a long story short, the ‘94 AF was a stop-gap measure predicated on a North Korean collapse, which goes a long way in explaining its limited scope and insufficient monitoring mechanisms.
Moreover, the ‘94 Agreement is not the reason why, despite the tensions over the nuclear program, things aren’t as bad as they were in ‘94. The simple fact is that the Bush administration — your insinuations of hot-headedness and impatiance not withstanding — has been almost unpardonably cool and patient with North Korea. Has the Bush administration parked two carriers off the Korean coast ala Clinton in ‘94? No. How has the Bush administration dealt with North Korean provocations? By ignoring them — hardly rash behavior. If you’re looking for reasons why things aren’t as bad as they were in ‘94, disregard the Agreed Framework and look toward the White House.
Game, set, match to Marmot…
Now if we could just bribe the Dear Leader to take his boys to LA and leave the keys to DPRK under the potted plant at the DMZ, we’d have it made!
“I have no reason to believe that North Korea’s continued diversion of scarce economic resources to its military-industrial complex will yield better results than the same policies did for the Soviet Union”.
Great discussion M., and excellent point about the economic irrationality of North Korean policies.
When you made this point it reminded me of reading about a visit to the USSR in the late 80’s (1987?) by American defense establishment leaders. I can’t remember who it was now who made this point — I think it was SecDef Weinberger or maybe it Chairman Joint Chiefs Admiral Crowe.
With the thaw under Gorbachev, US and USSR defense establishment leaders were visiting each other in their respective countries and talking about things, to include topics of shared professional interest (whose discussion once would have been unthinkable).
I think Weinberger (or whoever it was) asked his Soviet counterparts about their budgeting procedures, and mentioned how it was difficult for the US to predict its annual budget (ie not knowing the totality of incoming revenues, due to uncertainties of the economy and tax receipts).
(Also how it was hard to project the exact costs of major defense systems and account properly for them in the budget (ie cost overruns sometimes, in billions of dollars)).
What struck him forcibly was how uncomprehending his Soviet counterparts were of what he was talking about.
Our US political establishment may argue about whether a new defense program — call it, say, new fighter plane program “X” — may cost either 10, or 15 billion dollars over a certain amount of years.
Skeptical citizens and commentators might use this public discussion to try to make a political point. They might conclude that the defense procurement system is hopelessly corrupt and inept, and that we don’t need “X” anyway. Or perhaps they might say that we should instead buy new fighter plane “Y” which can do the same basic job and will cost either 5 or 6 billion dollars over the same period of years.
So — we end up arguing, but at least we have an idea of the size of the amounts we are arguing about. We “know what it is that we don’t know”.
Economic reality is outside the framework of Stalinist North Korea. If everything is the property of the state, to include the lives of its citizens, then rational economic analyis doesn’t matter because whatever the Marxist ruling elite decides is correct. “They don’t know what it is that they don’t know”.
They’re wrong of course, since while economics may be difficult to analyze because of its human behavior component and consequent unknown variables, the costs and benefits of economic decisions are very much real-world.
The resources NorK needs to divert to its defense program costs it the same as it would any other nation, whether they choose to acknowledge it or not. Having succeeded once in getting the US to subsidize it, it’s not surprising that the Dear Leader thinks he can continue to do so.
For anyone around him in the NorK political establishment to contradict him on these matters is probably not conducive to continued health and happiness. “The wrath of the prince means death”.
It took about 74 years or so for the Revolutionary generation to die out in Russia and for the bankruptcy of “War Communism” to finally assert itself. If we use the same time line for North Korea, I’d guess we’re looking at 2015 to 2025 for their final crisis (depending on whether you use a start date of 1945 or 1950).
But maybe less, since NorK doesn’t have the natural resources the USSR had (unless the Chinese keep propping them up).
I hope the next administration, be it Kerry or Bush, has the courage and foresight to see the same things you see and get our ground forces out before the collapse. There are so many good reasons for this that its logic seems overwhelming to me. Not the least of which might be a lessening of the NorK paranoia and a reduction of its tendency to lash out.
But if they do lash out, we need to be “out from under”.
It’s like living in a brick building in pre-1906 San Franscisco, Ralph. If the South Koreans, Japanese, and Chinese want to keep propping it up, fine. I say we jump in our SUV’s and head for Sacramento right now, before we’re trapped and it’s too late.