As you know, I’m becoming quite the fan of the Chosun Ilbo’s Lee Seon-min (who, despite the feminine name, is either a guy — judging from his photo on the Chosun — or the ugliest chick I’ve ever seen), who manages to write some of the best thought-out stuff the paper prints. In his latest column, “Waiting for Korea’s Neocons,” he writes on something many of us on the right who are genuinely embarrassed by the GNP have been feeling of late — Korean conservatism needs an identity change. Anyway, here’s a rough translation of the meat of his piece that I have quickly done before I head to the movies:
According to Irving Kristol, the first reason behind the success of neoconservatism is that it was forward-looking, not backward-looking. During the 1960s, when neoconservatism was born, conservatives didn’t like the changes brought about by the New Deal and longed for a return to pre-New Deal American society. The neocons, however, spoke of the future, and worked hard to present a new hopeful, optimistic vision of the future of American society.
The second factor behind its success is that they didn’t deny the causes presented by liberals [American usage], but inquired into the weakness of their implementation ideas. The neocons didn’t reject the causes introduced by liberals at that time, like human rights or the elimination of poverty and racism. Instead, they pointed out the problems in liberal policies to implement those ideals, and even more, they chose to present realistic, possible alternative policies.
What do the secrets of the American neocons’ success teach those of us who are assuming the task of rebuilding Korean conservatism? Firstly, Korean conservatism must no longer be soaked with the scent of the past. I mean, rather than talking about the 20th century, it should talk about the 21st century. Of course, we need to understand the past that has made our present, but that, too, must be discussed in connection with the future.
Moreover, causes like nationalism, independence, peace, human rights, and unification cannot be left as the exclusive property of the political left. While conservative intellectuals were displaying a passive attitude toward these epic tasks, they [the tasks] were soon lost to the leftists. Korean conservative intellectuals need to expose leftists as lacking the vision and ability to put those tasks into action, and even more, recapture those precious ideas by presenting persuasive alternative plans of action.
Now, even in Korea, it’s time for a “new conservatism” to set sail, one that can responsibly carry the nation and people into the future.
As I think I’ve written elsewhere, I have my qualms about some of the neocons’ foreign policy ideas, as I tend to adhere more to the paleocon line in foreign affairs. But Lee hits the nail right on the head here — liberalism, in its classical sense, has no future with the Korean right as it stands now. Korean conservatives need to sit down and figure out which way they want to take this country, because the more I listen to the current leadership of the GNP, the more I’m convinced they have no vision of the future what so ever. The longer that remains the case, the greater the chance that the nation’s future will become the exclusive territory of Noh Mu-hyeon, Lee Jong-seok, and their ideological ilk. Maybe Rep. Nam Kyung-pil and crew’s rebellion is a start. One can only hope so.
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Excellent article. Nice “rough” translation, wish my “rough” translations were that good!
neocon is an annoying phrase.
You may be “convinced [that] they [the GNP] have no vision of the future what so ever” [sic]; but the truly fundamental problem of Korean politics is that the entire “political class” (as the Korean press often refers to it) in fact shares and implements a single vision — that of themselves sidling up to the trough of Korea and eating their fill, and more. The various know-nothing nativist groups out there carp loudly about foreign investment because it supposedly results in the lifeblood of Korea being drawn off abroad for the benefit of strangers; but I’ll wager that if one were to sit down and do the numbers, it would be found that the sum of state reconstruction funds (i.e., the peoples tax receipts) stolen by Korean politicians and their Korean business world accomplices since the ‘97 financial crisis is of the same or gretaer level of magnitude as the dividend and interest remittances on foreign invested capital in Korea. And I’m just talking about the money that these guys have stolen that itself has gone walk about overseas in places hwere they can enjoy it without Uncle Kim and Aunt Min knowing about it. Then of course, there’s the same or greater amount of money that they’ve stolen for the purpose of corrupting the domestic political process — some amount of which finds its way to those same nativist elements (and others) in the form of walking-around money. It’s the Korean version of trickle-down economics - tickle-down graft. It’s not going to change until the folks at the lower echelons of the food chain figure out that they can do a lot better in the real world economy than in the autarchy of Korea’s peculiar economic system. Is that going to happen any time soon? We’re talking about the same people who put up with the tax farmers of the Silla, Goryeo and, most notoriously, the Joseon dynasties, not to mention the rampant corruption of the Rhee, Park, Chun, Roh and Kim(x2) regimes. URI has gotten as far as it has more, in my opinion, because it has tapped into the resentments (”han”) and aspirations generated and stifled by Korea’s past rulers,than because of anti-Americanism - which is just a kind of lightning rod for those feelings, (in the same way that Afghanistan and especially Iraq became easily identified foci for the feelings of Americans faced with an otherwise rather amorphous terrorist threat in the wake of 9/11) — but that’s another topic). Now, URI has lost its credibility because it’s been discovered to have its hands as deep in the nightsoil of Korean politics as the rest. And that’s the GNP’s problem times some multiple - although one that increasingly looks to be less than the 10 so rashly touted by the reckless pretender now sitting in the Blue House.
Sperwer has some excellent points.
I’ve never considered the MDP (and all the other one-man parties before it) progressive, or the other side of the aisle, conservative, because South Koreans refuse to take on the ideological issue, liberalism v. confucianism, head on. Progressives should be anti-confucianists, and conservatives, pro-confucianists. Foreign policy is a technical field, but in South Korea, its an ideological landmine. I’ve never felt comfortable agreeing with the GNP on foreign policy, but then again I find it very easy to ridicule the progressives for their timidity. What Sperwer says about the trough of South Korean politics is just shorthand for stripping confucianism bare and bloodied.
maybe in another two generations a group of courageous pols will appear who have the vision, funding, and trust to form a real ideological party rather than a fascist organization built around one man and his ability to suck corporate penis.
An interesting opinion of an Indian folk about his view about American political favoritism and corruption (at http://www.atimes.com):
[Please remember that a lot of things that are considered as corruption in India (and in the rest of the world) occur perfectly legally in the US and are not questioned at all, thus occurring on a much more humongous scale since they go unchallenged. The very concept of a military-industrial complex that dominates policymaking through its revolving-door culture - where officials move seamlessly between defense, industry and government - is alien to India. What we describe as bribery, you call "lobbying" or "campaign contributions" or "guaranteed position of consultant post-retirement for defense officials", etc. What we describe as favoritism, you call "special interest groups" or "secret/classified bidding for contracts", etc. Just different words, that's all.
Amit Sharma
Roorkee, India]
Uh, Mr. Shin, could you do me the honor of explaning how that has anything to do with the Grand National Party completely lacking a national vision?
Mr. Marmot, I was reading the commenting parts of Sperwer and Infidel about the bribery cases of the GNP, MDP and Uri Party. I found it interesting, what different views people (the guy from India) have about the definition of “political corruption”. Maybe it was somewhat off topic…
Click here and meet the New Conservatives in S.Korea
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TITLE: Less “Ideology”, More Honesty
BLOG NAME: SPERWER’S LOG [37'34"N/126'58"E]
Marmot’s Hole, about the consistently best blog I’ve come across on Korea, had an interesting piece yesterday, based on a Chosun Ilbo pundit’s views about the need for the GNP to come up with a more progressive neocon line in