The Marmot’s Hole

I usually like Tom Plate’s analysis, but someone has got to tell him to lay off that Southern Cal ganja. I simply refuse to believe that he could have written this without a head full of pot:

A terrific opportunity presents itself later this month (Feb. 25), in Beijing. There, North Korean negotiators are scheduled to sit down with high-level representatives from China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States for round two of the so-called ?��six-party talks.?�? These talks do not require rocket science; the issue is simple. North Korea is prepared to freeze its nuclear program in return for a guarantee of non-aggression from the United States, which it fears desires to Saddamize it. Next, the North would need to begin dismantling its atomic arsenal piece by piece as economic aid pours into its diseased economy.

Oh, is it that simple, Mr. Plate? Being somewhat of a heartless, Kissinger-esque bastard, I won’t deal with the ethical issues of pouring economic aid into a regime that has chosen to starve its own people. And he’s right to point out that these talks do not require rocket-science. In fact, they require complete separation from one’s rational faculties. If North Korea wanted to stay out of the Americans’ cross-hairs, it wouldn’t have started its nuclear program in the first place. The North Koreans started an artificial crisis not because of [external] threats, but because they know, from past experience, that it’s a tried and true method of extorting aid from its wealthier neighbors. It would seem to me, given North Korea’s past behavior, that it will agree to accept large amounts of aid in return for a promise to dismantle its nuclear facilities, and when the time is right, generate another crisis that would require its neighbors to throw in more goodies just to get back to square one. Hey, I can understand if some people simply want to pay the North Koreans off because its cheaper than taking care of the problem once and for all. I certainly don’t want to see a war break out (and the fact that I’ve rented a house right next to the U.S. 8th Army headquarters in Yongsan has nothing to do with it). But let’s not make it seem like getting the North Koreans to give up the Mother of All Meal Tickets is a simple matter, because it just ain’t.

Should all this occur, the net regional gain here would be staggering. But there is one participant in the Beijing talks, however, that is unenthused about re-negotiating a freeze and re-starting an economic aid program: the Bush administration. It points out that the United States in 1994 took precisely this approach, and it turned out to be a turkey of a deal: Pyongyang cheated on its promise not to re-arm.

Washington?��s cynicism is understandable _ but it is dysfunctional. The Bush administration needs to listen more carefully to Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul and let them take the lead on economic aid if it refuses to be seen as ?��rewarding?�? North Korea’s perfidy. As for the nettlesome verification question _ Is the North really freezing? And then, is it really disarming? _ this is only a short-term problem if the overwhelming and presumably inevitable consequence of a six-party regional-security pact is to open up North Korea. Its future scenario could include substantial investment, rapid modernization, a dose of helpful Westernization and a boatload of Western tourists _ not to mention to cagey CIA agents dressed like used car salesmen from Fargo.

Firstly, the last thing the U.S. should be doing is listening to Beijing and Seoul. It’s not like Beijing couldn’t have leaned more on North Korea to keep it from going nuclear. Sure, the Chinese don’t want North Korea to go nuclear, because it could possibly lead to Japan going nuclear, but they weren’t willing to do what great powers do to prevent the shit hitting the fan. Besides, the North Koreans won’t be targeting Chinese cities. Ditto goes for Seoul. Again, it’s not like the South Koreans want to see Kim Jong-il with his finger on the button, but they are much more concerned with Seoul getting flattened than they are with the possibility of a North Korean nuclear weapon being sold to terrorists and later detonated in a major American city. And perhaps they should be — if Seoul doesn’t look out for its own interests, who will? But let’s not pretend like the South Koreans really have our interests at heart when they advise to pump money into North Korea, because they don’t. As many South Koreans like to point out, America pursues its policies in Northeast Asia based on its own [selfish] interests, which should may be true, but there is no reason to assume that South Korea does any differently.

Now, as for Plate’s scenario of “cagey CIA agents dressed like used car salesmen from Fargo” roaming around the Workers Paradise, this is proof positive that his dealer is getting much better stuff than is commonly available in the Republic of Korea. If the North Koreans have learned one thing from history, it’s that doses of helpful Westernization and a boatloads of Western tourists do not, generally speaking, do a Stalinist dictatorship good — I’m sure that just reading what Plate wrote sent chills down the spines of North Korea’s nomenklatura. To the extent that North Korea is undergoing social and economic changes, they appear to be happening despite the central government’s efforts, not because of them. In fact, it would seem that North Korea’s social-economic condition resembles that of a war economy in the final stage of collapse, not that of a state poised on instituting epic-making reforms. If North Korea was really interested in pursuing economic reforms, it would have started them a long time ago. The fact that North Korea has sought to rejuvenate its economy through international extortion rather than pursuing potentially regime-threatening reforms tells you a lot about just how unready P’yongyang is to modernize and/or Westernize, let alone let the men from Fargo run around in the country. I’d be willing to bet what little money I have that as the North Korean state strengthens as foreign money flows into the country, rather than embrace the socio-economic changes that have accompanied the breakdown in the state’s ability to deliver basic goods and services to its populace, the North Korean leadership will seek to re-impose central command in an effort to prevent independent axes of power from developing outside of state control.

Like I said, I usually like what Plate has to say, and the fact that he’s a respected scholar and I’m a hack blogger tells you a lot about our respective levels of expertise. Still, I can tell pot-induced analysis when I see it.

UPDATE: Conrad of the Gweilo Diaries lets fly with his thoughts on Plate as well.