Anyway, my initial feeling upon reading this piece was that the “unique” phenomenon is not very unique at all. I agree with Mr. Stevenson — the rise of nationalism, as described in Lee’s piece, seems disturbingly similar to what we saw in the West immediately prior to WWI. Lee points out that as states democratize and societies become more complex, there is a tendency for states to get along better with one another. That may be true, but since the example usually given to support that claim is the West, it should be pointed out that it may have been historical experience, i.e. two world wars in a 30-year period, rather than democratization that turned the West into a “zone of peace” (at least amongst themselves). In the case of East Asia, not only are states, as Lee points out, right at that stage of socio-economic development where ugly things tend to happen between them, but the lessons they took from the Pacific War (which, in my view, anyway, was more of a colonial war for control of Asia rather than a war fought between Asians for control over their own destinies) were quite different. Rather than drawing the conclusion that extreme nationalism — as a general concept — is bad, many East Asian intellectuals (but not all, of course) seem to have drawn the conclusion that extreme nationalism — in its Japanese form — is bad. That’s a very different conclusion to make, and one that doesn’t bode well for the future of peace and security in the region (it is, after all, one of the reasons why we have some intellectuals and politicians in China and Korea condemning Japanese “militarism” one second, and making statements eerily similar to those made by 1930s Japanese nationalists the next). But like I said, experience can be a great teacher. As strong, modern nation-states, Northeast Asian countries have never fought a war between themselves. Maybe such wars are simply a natural part of the development process.

We’ll see, I guess.

“horace, so you mean korea might finally be catching up with japan? japan has long feared a strong china and has been very careful to have a good friendship with us because of it.”

Call me “Jeffery.” Yes, I mean something like that, except that Korea’s relations to the U.S. are complicated by the fact of North Korea. I don’t expect Koreans to have markedly better views of the U.S. until after reunification.

Jeffery Hodges

“As China grows in both economic and international political strength, fissures have developed between it and Korea. According to Shin Uk-hui of Seoul National University, the current situation has forced people to think deeply about Korea??р꽓s long-term relationship with China, a relationship Koreans hadn??р꽓t expressed much interest in.”

I made a similar point two weeks ago in a presentation in Seoul.

For the past 50 years, Korea has been preoccupied with Japan and the United States but hasn’t thought much about China. Since the early 80s, and probably partly in reaction to the Kwangju Massacre, younger Koreans have increasingly seen the U.S. as an imperial power and Korea as its quasi-colony. Tensions with China will begin to remind Koreans that China had long been the real imperial power in this region and might give Koreans a different perspective on America’s role in Northeast Asia.

However, Korean “han” and Korea’s related sense of itself as the victim of powerful nations distort Korean foreign policy and Korea’s understanding of its national interest, and this isn’t likely to change until reunification. Thus, even with a different perspective on the need for an American presence here, many Koreans will probably continue to resent the United States.

In short, as long as Korea feels weak, it will both need and resent the U.S., and it will feel weak as long as it remains divided.

Jeffery Hodges