The Marmot’s Hole

I promised you a translation of that OhMyNews analysis piece by Kim T’ae-kyeong on the planned changes to the American military presence in South Korea, and here it is. If some of it sounds funny, give me a break - it ain’t easy translating this stuff.

It was completely agreed upon on November 19 that the ROK-US Joint Command and the UN Command will be moving entirely to the Osan-Pyongtaek area. And since the 2nd Infantry Division currently based north of the Han River will start moving to Osan-Pyongtaek in 2006, the “tripwire” role that the USFK has played is disappearing.

The Korean government has accepted the American intention of changing USFK into a mobile army for use in Northeast Asia (aimed at China and Russia) and turning Osan-Pyongtaek into a regional Northeast Asian Command. Accordingly, the Americans are redeploying USFK in line with their military strategy, and strong criticism is expected, claiming that their is no need for the Korea to take on pay the entire cost of the move - costs that will be between three and five billion dollars (according to official Ministry of Defense announcements)

Moreover, with the current US-ROK military alliance and USFK being transformed into a mobile army aimed at China and Russia, Korea may turn China and Russia into military enemies and serious diplomatic problems are foreseen.

On November 21, one government source said, “During the administrative talks that followed the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Seoul on the 19th, the US and Korea agreed to move the US-ROK Command and the UN Command entirely to the Osan-Pyongtaek area,” and “In the future, not one American soldier will remain at Yongsan.”

According to this source, “At the US base in Yongsan, the hotel known as “Dragon Village” will remain as as lodging for American soldiers,” and “problems such as the 80,000 pyong site for US Embassy residences and the upkeep of the US helicopter pad still remain, but these issues are secondary. The negotiations for the move are, in fact, completely concluded.” The US Embassy has confirmed these facts as well.

The administrative talks on the 19th were attended by Cha Yeong-gu, Vice Ministry of Defense in charge of policy, and Richard Lawless, Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Department of Defense. Even though talks on the Yongsan move failed during the SCM meeting on the 17th, an agreement was reached in only two days.

Turning Osan-Pyongtaek into a Northeast Asia Regional Command

In the joint statement released after the SCM meeting on the 17th [Marmot's note: If you want, take a look at it here], the two sides reaffirmed “the principle that the realignment and consolidation of the US forces based in Korea into two hubs south of the Han River will proceed in two phase,” and “Emphasizing that the first phase should begin as soon as possible, they reaffirmed that the exact timing of the second phase of relocations will be determined by the highest national authorities according to the principles expressed in the ROK-US Presidential Joint Press Statements of 14 May and 20 October 2003.”

The first stage will consist of the Americans based in Yongsan being moved to Osan-Pyongtaek, while the 2nd Infantry Division, currently spread out in installations north of the Han River, will consolidate around Tongducheon and Uijeongbu. After this, the second stage will take place starting in 2006 when the 2nd Infantry Division will be moved completely to Osan-Pyongtaek. This means that after 2006, not one American soldier will be based north of the Han River, and the “tripwire” concept they represented will disappear.

USFK, which is currently a “mechanized infantry division” armed with heavy weapons is being transformed into a light, mobile army with units such as the Stryker brigades. Last June, when Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz visited Korea and said, “In order to augment USFK’s fighting power, we have decided to pump 11 billion dollars into it,” this is precisely what he meant.

In the end, USFK, which to now has served as a deterrent against the North, is changing into a force to counter threats in the Northeast Asian region from countries like China and Russia. Osan-Pyongtaek will naturally become the US military’s Northeast Asian command center.

USFK Troop Reductions are Unavoidable

It seems that as USFK switches to the Stryker brigades, reductions in troop numbers may be unavoidable.

According to an AP report from October 18, a source in the US administration and security experts said, “The Administration plans to reduce USFK by 12,000 men, a third of its current strength of 37,000 men,” and “details are being discussed with the Korean government.”

The AP report revealed that “If an agreement is reached, the character of the remaining troops will be that of an “expeditionary force” capable of being deployed anywhere in the Asia-Pacific region.” In reference to this, George Bush said during the APEC summit held in Thailand on October 20 that “All this is the low-level clerks recklessly speaking their own minds. It has nothing to do with official decisions by the US government.”

However, this was nothing but a temporary explanation. According to another Korean government source, “The AP report was right on,” and “In fact, it’s known that the US has recently told us that troop strength may be reduced by even more than the 12,000 men originally planned.”

During testimony before Congress last summer, Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stressed that “No longer would the US military be a political ‘tripwire’ along the DMZ.” And Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who attended this year’s SCM meeting, stressed “USFK’s flexibility” and told foreign reporters that “American soldiers will no longer remain along the DMZ.”

This is not the first time the United States has tried to reduce its troop strength in Korea. The United States announced its East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI) in 1992: it called for a two-phased reduction in American troops in Korea (each phase would reduce the number by 7,000, with 15,000 troops being withdrawn in total), with a third phase that would establish a “Korean-centered defense,” dismantle the ROK-US Combined Forces Command, and leave remaining only small formations of American troops.

However, as the North Korean nuclear crisis reared its head, only the first phase of the EASI was carried out and further reductions were put on hold. But when George Bush took office in 2000, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld commenced operations to reorganize he US military. A US military which was armed with heavy weapons would be transformed into a light, highly mobile force that could be rapidly deployed anywhere in the world.

The Stryker brigades are a result of Rumsfeld’s military reforms. Noh Mu-hyeon’s stressing of an “independent defense” soon after his inauguration is also an acknowledgment of this change in American strategy.

Why is Korea paying the costs of base relocation?

During the SCM meeting on the 17th, Korea and the US could not come to an agreement about the Yongsan move. The US requested 280,000 pyong of the total 780,000 pyong of Yongsan base to house the headquarters of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. The Korean side said it was willing to provide only 170,000 pyong. But in only two days time, an agreement was eventually reached.

According to a government source, “The US was originally going to move everything, including the headquarters of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, to Osan-Pyongtaek, but the Korean government wanted some American to remain [at Yongsan] because of citizen unease, ” and “The US first said that the Combined Forces Command could stay, and that 100,000 pyong would be enough, but later the amount of land requested grew to 280,000 pyong.”

The Korean government, which had come out offering 170,000 pyong, set down a compromise target of 220,000 pyong. But the US continued to demand 280,000 pyong. As a result of the negotiation agreement, the area of the remaining American installation at Yongsan will be considerably bigger than the 170,000 pyong offered by Korea in the beginning.

For Korea to pay the entire cost of moving the Yongsan garrison is a big problem. The logic behind Korea having to pay for the move comes from the fact that Korea was the first to request the base be moved when the Noh Tae-woo Administration did so in 1988. The US military had the burden of paying for the consolidation of the 2nd Infantry Division’s military facilities around Dongducheon and Uijeongbu because this plan is the US military’s own.

However, not only Yongsan, but the 2nd Infantry Division will also be moving to Osan-Pyongtaek starting in 2006, and there is no need for the Korean government to pay the entire cost of 2ID’s move.

Conservatives, Progressives Criticize Agreement

On November 21, GNP spokesmen Pak Jin said, “[GNP head] Choe Byeong-nyeol and others have strongly insisted on an agreement with the Americans that will allow the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and the UN Command to remain in its current position,” and “This is to allay the security concerns of the citizens, prevent North Korea from misjudging the situation, and to entice foreign investment and save the national economy.”

Critical voiced from the progressive camp have been load as well. Yu Young-jae, the head of the citizens’ group “Peace and Unification People” ’s peace and disarmament team, criticized the agreement saying, “Essentially, the Yongsan move is a redeployment that follows the Americans’ new military strategy. It’s not reasonable for Korea to pay the entire costs of the move.”

“What’s more, while USFK is transforming into a mobile army for use in Northeast Asia, it will become aimed at China and Russia,” and “Given the current relationship under the US-ROK military alliance, unnecessary military tensions cannot help but increase with Russia and China while the ROK military is subordinate to USFK.”

In fact, this is the biggest problem. [USFK's] transformation into a mobile American army in Northeast Asia is targeting China, which seems like it will exceed the US in GDP by 2020, and Russia, which is seeking to stabilize.

The United States is looking to make a Northeast Asian military alliance to counter China and Russia based on Korean land forces, Japanese sea power, and American air power. America’s positive attitude toward the passing of Japan’s “emergency legislation” that enables the Japanese Self Defense Force to be deployed overseas is because of this.

Some pretty interesting stuff. Some of the final analysis is a little questionable - even assuming China exceeded the US in GDP by 2020 (dubious), given its population, it would still be a remarkably poor country compared to its potential adversaries, and if Russia did manage to right itself, the first country to which it will pose a threat is China. Besides, even if a Sino-Russian coalition were to arise (or either one of them were to become powerful enough to pose a credible threat on its own), South Korea (or even a unified Korea) better hope to hell it’s got the United States watching its back. Interestingly enough, Kim never mentions the most important implication of a complete American withdrawal from the peninsula - full fledged Japanese remilitarization (likely backed by the United States) and Korea in a world of hurt - but this is really beside the point. Assuming all goes well (a major assumption when USFK issues are concerned), the force structure in Korea looking at a major overhaul, and the USFK of 2010 will be a very different fighting force than the USFK of today. For South Korea, the implications of such a transformation are enormous, and one can only hope that President Noh’s talk of an “independent defense” is more than just talk.