The Marmot’s Hole

Today’s Hankyoreh ran a column by Prof. Kim Yeon-ch’eol of Koryo University’s Asian Research Center entitled “The Dispatch of Combat Troops to Iraq is a Catastrophe.” Needless to say, I found it objectionable on several levels. Anyway, without further ado, let the fisking begin.
[Marmot's note: column translated into English by yours truly - reader beware]

The fate that awaits this country if it sends combat troops to Iraq is so horrible that I hate to even imagine it. Most citizens acknowledge the need to participate in Iraq, but they oppose the dispatch of combat troops. If President Noh sends combat troops, not a soul will continue to support his government. Intelligent people will leave the Blue House, and New Party will announce a separation with Noh’s government, and the forces of reform will actively seek a political alternative. If the forces of reform lose their center and wander, the majority of citizens - desiring security - will judge that even a bad government is better than no government at all. The confidence vote will lose its meaning as the nation descends into anarchy.

Hold on there, tough guy. Anarchy, if it does befall this country, will be a product of a) the split up of the Millennium Democratic Party and the creation of an even smaller minority ruling party and b) Noh’s announcement to seek a vote of confidence. And yes, it’s true that by sending combat troops to Iraq, Roh threatens to alienate those in his party and anger those to whom he traditionally looked for support. So? Who cares? Those “forces of reform,” like it or not, do not a majority make, and if Noh wants to make policy decisions based on a desire to please them, he stands to piss off the rest of the country. People are threatening to leave the Blue House over Iraq? Good - screw’em. In fact, screw the whole lot of ‘em - starting even before the President assumed office, there have been questions about those whom Noh chose to surround himself with, and if Noh would like to win a vote of confidence AND stop being treated like a little bitch, he needs to do what my friend over at Flying Yangban tells him to do - triangulate. Step one is shaking up the Blue House in a major sort of way.

Economically, how will this affect the nation? In this case, in fact, the “national interest” debate has no meaning. In the political chaos and anarchy that would follow the dispatch of combat troops to Iraq, our country risk rating would collapse and investors would leave. Anarchy carries with it costs even dearer than those associated with a worsening of US-ROK bilateral ties. Internationally, Korea will become a target of terrorists. Turkey, Pakistan… no one is going to Iraq. As time goes on, terrorism is becoming more and more organized, and terrorism is increasing against the multinational forces in Iraq. In a situation where no one else is participating, Korea - the sole nation sending combat forces - will become a target for Middle Eastern terrorists throughout the world.

Firstly, if it’s true that investors will flee South Korea should it send troops to Iraq (complete horseshit, BTW), wait until you see how fast they run when it’s the 8th Army getting sent to Iraq instead. Ditto goes for the risk rating. Besides, no matter how hard I try, I can’t think of a single possible scenario in which seeing Iraq go to hell results in tangible economic benefits to Korea. And if there’s an argument that pisses me off most, it’s the one that goes “Oh no, if we send combat troops, we’ll become a target of terrorists!” Unfortunately, it’s one of the most commonly heard. Look, the US spent nearly fifty years making its own cities targets for Soviet missiles in order to guarantee the security of Western Europe and the Pacific Rim. Since the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953, the US has placed its own men and women at risk along the DMZ in order to ensure the security of South Korea. Now, because of its mutual security pact with the ROK, American cities may very well become the targets of North Korean nuclear warheads. I’m fairly sure that the Korean government would take a very dim view of things should the Americans one day decide that, well, although they’d like to help South Korea ward off an invasion from the North, they simply do not want to put LA or Seatle at risk. Afraid of becoming a “target for terrorists?” Cry me a fuckin’ river. Iraq aside, any assistance that the South Korean government decides to provide us in the “War on Terror” is going to make it a target, and if that’s a cost the ROK government is unwilling to pay, then it can no longer be called an ally in that war. And if I’ve said it once, I’ll say it a thousand times - if South Korea shows no interest in American security concerns - and such a lack of interest is implied in Kim’s piece - then stick a fork in the US-ROK alliance, because it is wholly and truly done.

But it’s not too late. It’s standard procedure, in deciding policy, to eliminate the worst scenario first. We must escape from despair and catastrophe. Although the government has already made it clear - indirectly - through official announcements that the dispatch will not center on combat troops, nobody believes those announcements. Firstly, the government must recover the people’s trust in its policy decisions. When you look at the unreliable fact finding team to Iraq and the rough way in which the government made the decision to send troops, you can see how the government lost the people’s trust. What must be done?
The Blue House must immediately replace those who favor sending troops to Iraq unconditionally. They have spoken of their personal hopes as if they were government decisions, and even now they still play to the press. The Blue House must improve the moral fiber of those who serve in it. The problem with the decision on sending troops to Iraq is that those who did most of the negotiating ignored the domestic policy decision process. If we leave further negotiations to these people, it will do little good for our relations with the US. Even from the American point of view, if Korea expresses its position frankly, its uncertainty concerning us will diminish. If, during initial negotiations, they have already said that our troops will replace the US 101 Airborne Division in the area around Mosul, then further negotiations will be difficult. Replacing those who negotiated the dispatch agreement in itself will clarify Korea’s basic position, and is the only way that our positions may be reflected in further negotiations with the Americans.

Stating frankly a position such as the one espoused by Kim will indeed remove all American uncertainty concerning South Korea. Due to the decision by the Noh government to dispatch combat troops to the Mosul area in relief of the 101 Airborne Division (and it does appear that the decision has already been made. official announcements not withstanding), there are those in Washington who still count among their allies the current South Korean Administration. Backtrack on that decision, and any faith and goodwill built up by South Korea will be lost. Say goodbye to 8th Army, and say goodbye to any influence you might have had in American policy towards North Korea. The GNP - who do make up a majority in the National Assembly - will have a field day, and for Noh, to backtrack again over a major issue will do little in helping to regain the citizens’ trust. It will, however, go a long way in confirming the commonly held belief that he lacks the backbone necessary for national leadership
Note about replacing the Blue House staff: look, don’t blame Noh’s negotiators for this one - it was Noh’s call, and he made it. This may be due to the fact that Noh has a much better view of the national interest from his office behind the Kyongbok Palace than do research professors at Koryo University (or certain bloggers, for that matter).

The government must announce that combat troops are not the focal point of the dispatch to Iraq as soon as possible - even now. This is to reduce the split in public opinion. Noncombat troops - small formations of medical and engineering units - should make up the core of the detachment. Bureaucrats in the Defense Ministry are going to get the units arrange appropriately, but the criterion has already been established. In the case of non-combat troops, the nature and composition of those forces are known, but they need to be placed in an area where they are afforded security. Naturally, one must eliminate from ones choices placing them in areas which are insecure. Even in the United States, it’s acknowledged that northern Iraq - including the area around Mosul - together with central Baghdad are the most insecure regions in the country. In particular, the existence of Kurdish guerrillas means that even after Iraq reconstitutes itself as a nation, Korea stands a strong chance of becoming bogged down in a long-term quagmire. If we say we are going to replace the US 101 Airborne Division, combat troops must form the core of our dispatch. So Mosul is no good. Iraq is different from East Timor or Bosnia. So far, we have managed to maintain good relations with Arab nations, and the initial dispatch of medical and engineering units was received well. We can’t tear down all we’ve worked to achieve by making one mistake.

Lots o’ ugliness here. First, announcing - despite American requests and previous agreements to the contrary - that the country will NOT be sending combat troops will split public opinion just as deeply as sending them. And the people you’re likely to piss off carry with them a little more weight politically than the NGO-student crowd. If you don’t see street demonstrations, that’s only because they have a legislative majority and the Chosun Ilbo to do their dirty work. And small formations of medical and engineering units? Gee, Kim, thanks a lot. I’m guessing that in the case of an emergency here on the Peninsula, the government of the ROK would expect a slightly more substantial contribution from its ally. Kim Dae-jung pulled the same shit in Afghanistan, claiming that his dispatch of medical units to that country was consistent with Korea’s responsibilities under the US-ROK mutual defense pact - not a good way to win friends. Besides, the immediate problem in Iraq is security. Sending more medical and engineering units - all of whom need protection from other units - will constitute nothing but a burden on already busy peacekeepers. Quagmire? I’ll show you a quagmire - there have been American servicemen along the DMZ for fifty years. Finally, let’s deal with Kim’s atrocious admonition that Korea must avoid pissing off Arab states (God, what is it with the Hankyoreh and appeasing dictators?). First off, if it’s a choice between, say, angering your closest and most important ally (who just also happened to be the world’s only superpower) and angering a bunch of weak, tin-pot dictatorships who are important only in that they possess large quantities of oil (which they’ll continue to sell to you no matter what you decide), which one do you make? Second, what makes you so sure that the Arabs are going to be so pissed off at you because you contributed combat troops? [Most] Arab states, after all, would like to see peace and stability return to Iraq, and I can’t see how they’d hold it against South Korea for helping to bring that about. Now, if you’re talking about pissing off the Arab people, yeah, you run that risk, but then again, nobody else seems to care about the “Arab street” when they formulate policy (and for good reason), so why should Korea? Finally, the last thing in the world South Korea would like to see is the United States turn around and use the same logic here in Northeast Asia - last time it did, it resulted in the Taft-Katsura Pact.

There’s a need to participate in Iraq’s reconstitution as a nation, but if we go without properly preparing for all the things that can happen later, regretful things will keep occurring. Starting with a new fact finding mission, we must make full preliminary preparations necessary to send noncombat troops to Iraq. The great interests of international society not withstanding, one has to know why one is not participating. Right now, President Noh’s government stands at a [political] crossroad between life and death. Yet the path is already clear. To send combat troops would be to commit a political suicide over which none will grieve.

Yeah, but kill the US-ROK alliance, and you’ve committed national suicide, and it’s one over which many will grieve. Noh does indeed stand at a political crossroad - one of his own choosing, coincidentally - but it’s for a myriad of different reasons other than the troop dispatch to Iraq. Yes, Noh stands to alienate those who put him in power by sending combat troops to Iraq, but then again, by turning the county’s decision-making process over to said people, he stands to alienate a great many more. In a democracy, we elect people to make the decisions which are best for the nation, not those which are the most popular and / or beneficial to certain special interest groups. By refusing to send combat troops to Iraq, not only does Noh pass on an opportunity to improve his nation’s standing globally and protect some of its most vital interests, he also stands to lose a great deal more. He runs the risk of diplomatically isolating himself from the United States, and alienating further large and powerful constituencies within South Korea. And that would be truly regretful.