The Marmot’s Hole

In the current issue of Policy Review, Henry S. Rowen of da’ Hoover Institute contributes some outstanding analysis of the situation in North Korea - be sure to read it thoroughly. Let me reprint some of the money shots below.

On Kim Jong Il’s “Game”

Kim is often portrayed in the West as a skillful player of a weak hand. Lately, however, his play looks erratic, as Nicholas Eberstadt has noted. He botched the creation of a special economic zone (in Sinuiju) with the Chinese and blew the opportunity to get several billion dollars soon in reparation payments from Japan by his handling of the kidnappings of Japanese citizens, and his trumpeting about nuclear weapons is helping to unify his opponents. These actions have led to cuts in the flow of fuel and food and to reports that once again the population is on the brink of famine.
He may not understand the fire with which he is playing. Building nuclear weapons puts other nations in danger, and if his having these weapons isn’t enough to provoke the U.S. and perhaps the Chinese to end his rule, the prospect of North Korean fissionable material coming into the hands of terrorists should do it.

On the North Korean “mess”:

Some market-oriented reforms notwithstanding, there is little evidence of a willingness to undertake basic ones. Juche is one explanation for this reluctance to liberalize, but there are others. Kim and his core supporters must perceive their tenure as being more fragile than have the Chinese leaders; hence a stronger insistence on keeping control. And their initiatives have been extraordinarily inept. Outsiders often comment on the ignorance of Northern officials about the world economy and how markets work.
Widespread expectations through the mid-1990s of an early collapse, especially after Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, have been succeeded by the belief that Kim Jong Il’s rule will be limited only by his longevity - and that one of his sons might succeed him. This view arguably weighs too little the effects of life at the margin of starvation for many people, meager resources for many core supporters, and increasing knowledge of the people about the outside world. An appropriate image is that of a gambler who every year faces a significant, perhaps now increasing, chance of ruin.

On South Korea:

Until circa 1990, one could fairly say that American and South Korean interests were congruent: Both were about the security of the South and its consolidation of democracy. The robustness of Korean democracy is no longer in doubt. The problem is security. Of course both want to avert war, but Americans (and Japanese and apparently Chinese) perceive greater dangers from the North’s missile and nuclear weapons than do South Koreans. Southerners (rightly or wrongly) do not expect the North’s missiles or nuclear weapons to land on them, nor do they see themselves as the target of nuclear-armed terrorists. Americans see themselves as threatened both ways.

On China:

China’s apparent lack of vigor might simply reflect a reluctance to tackle forcefully a fellow communist-ruled state many of whose senior officials are old comrades. Or might it be based on the view that the Americans and others will pay to solve it? Or, more ominously, might China judge that U.S.-South Korean differences will preclude war, that they will speed the departure of American forces from the mainland of Asia, and that Japan is no longer a major force? Whatever the combination of views in Beijing, a failure to act decisively could leave China with three more nuclear-armed neighbors - two in Korea plus Japan - along with other troubles.
The mirror image of the putative Chinese view - “Let the Americans solve it” - is an American one: “Let the Chinese solve it.” Why is this not mainly a Chinese problem, on the view that they have more to lose than anyone else from a nuclear-armed Northeast Asia? That might be so if it were not for the North’s possible sale of bomb materials. A more considered view is that we have enough shared interests with the Chinese to try jointly to solve the problem of the North.

On Japan:

This crisis brings to the fore our role in the defense of Japan. So far we have been unable to assure the safety of Japan against North Korean threats; hence the growth in the attitude that Japan has to do more for itself. A big cut in our forces in Korea would have repercussions in Japan, and their total withdrawal even more so. Much would depend on the context. Our leaving in anything like the present situation would create alarm. On the other hand, a reduction or even withdrawal associated with the creation of a unified, democratic, non-nuclear Korea would be much less alarming. But even in so favorable a case, a new U.S.-Japan security formula would be needed. For now, the Japanese still hope the U.S. will solve this problem, and they are willing to help.

Policy suggestions:

If something like an Agreed Framework Mark ii is reached, there will be celebrations over having averted a great danger. One should not be too ready to carp at whatever emerges; this is a problem from hell. But elation would be premature. The inspection requirements for confidence that the fissile material production programs - and any fabricated bombs - are gone are so stringent as to be unlikely to be met, and as Pyongyang demonstrated recently, the inspectors could be thrown out at any time. It is axiomatic that any government headed by Kim Jong Il will have nuclear weapons, despite any agreement signed by his government (unless the Chinese take decisive action).
Therefore, we should aim to have a leadership in Pyongyang committed to developing the country, rather than surviving on nuclear extortion, as a step towards the political unification of the peninsula. This implies the end of the Kim dynasty. Since the end of the Korean War we have accepted the division and constant tensions, interspersed with crises, as inevitable. We have reacted to events instead of creating them. It is too dangerous to keep doing this.

Anyway, Rowen provides us with some brilliant stuff that’s well worth the time to read it. Make sure you do.
(Hat tip to Korean Media Watch)