Comments on: Shut up, Peanuts! http://www.rjkoehler.com/2003/09/03/shut-up-peanuts/ Korea... in Blog Format Fri, 5 Dec 2008 08:31:05 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6.3 By: Anticipatory Retaliation http://www.rjkoehler.com/2003/09/03/shut-up-peanuts/#comment-86 Anticipatory Retaliation Fri, 05 Sep 2003 05:27:31 +0000 http://rjkoehler.com/?p=41#comment-86 I think you've pretty much summed it up. The whole thing that still makes me a bit skitchy on the whole deal is related, in some way to the respective ideologies. In the west, war is viewed as a breakdown of deterrence (i.e. communication) quite often stemming from the kinds of scenarios you describe. In Marxist-Leninist doctrine, war is seen as the inevitable outcome of class struggles and is part of the inexorable historical dialectic. It's that kind of basic core difference in concept that is part of why I'm spooked. The other question I have though is what constitutes a win? I would place fairly good money on the notion that even KJI is beginning to realize that an extention of the mid-90's status quo is an absolute total loss for North Korea. Just because there's no shooting doesn't mean that their not facing an existential threat. I don't see a lot of appetizing ways out for North Korea. Guess it kinda sucks to choose a totally bass-ackward political system. I think you’ve pretty much summed it up. The whole thing that still makes me a bit skitchy on the whole deal is related, in some way to the respective ideologies.

In the west, war is viewed as a breakdown of deterrence (i.e. communication) quite often stemming from the kinds of scenarios you describe.

In Marxist-Leninist doctrine, war is seen as the inevitable outcome of class struggles and is part of the inexorable historical dialectic.

It’s that kind of basic core difference in concept that is part of why I’m spooked.

The other question I have though is what constitutes a win? I would place fairly good money on the notion that even KJI is beginning to realize that an extention of the mid-90’s status quo is an absolute total loss for North Korea. Just because there’s no shooting doesn’t mean that their not facing an existential threat. I don’t see a lot of appetizing ways out for North Korea.

Guess it kinda sucks to choose a totally bass-ackward political system.

]]> By: The Marmot http://www.rjkoehler.com/2003/09/03/shut-up-peanuts/#comment-85 The Marmot Fri, 05 Sep 2003 00:30:31 +0000 http://rjkoehler.com/?p=41#comment-85 No argument with anything that you've said - I think it was Randall Parker at Parapundit who made the analogy to 1941 Japan in order to point out that states do not always calculate their interests correctly. As you point out correctly, Iraq miscalculated its chances in 1991 - with equally disasterous results (for Baghdad, at least). However, call it gut instinct, but I don't think the North Koreans are prepared to make the same mistake. First off, the environment is much different - in 1941, it was possible to come up with scenarios by which Japan could have won a limited victory (unlikely those scenarios might have been), and Iraq was surrounded by weak powers and counted on the Americans giving them a pass. I find it difficult for North Korea, despite "victory scenarios" available for your reading pleasure on the Internet, to conceive of a war ending in any way other than one - total defeat. Even without American support, South Korea has the capabilities to defend itself, as does Japan. Still, you are correct - the decision-making process in states such as North Korea have at time proved faulty, and sometimes you have to wonder just how much of their own propoganda the North Korean leadership believe. No argument with anything that you’ve said - I think it was Randall Parker at Parapundit who made the analogy to 1941 Japan in order to point out that states do not always calculate their interests correctly. As you point out correctly, Iraq miscalculated its chances in 1991 - with equally disasterous results (for Baghdad, at least). However, call it gut instinct, but I don’t think the North Koreans are prepared to make the same mistake. First off, the environment is much different - in 1941, it was possible to come up with scenarios by which Japan could have won a limited victory (unlikely those scenarios might have been), and Iraq was surrounded by weak powers and counted on the Americans giving them a pass. I find it difficult for North Korea, despite “victory scenarios” available for your reading pleasure on the Internet, to conceive of a war ending in any way other than one - total defeat. Even without American support, South Korea has the capabilities to defend itself, as does Japan. Still, you are correct - the decision-making process in states such as North Korea have at time proved faulty, and sometimes you have to wonder just how much of their own propoganda the North Korean leadership believe.

]]> By: Anticipatory Retaliation http://www.rjkoehler.com/2003/09/03/shut-up-peanuts/#comment-84 Anticipatory Retaliation Thu, 04 Sep 2003 09:13:45 +0000 http://rjkoehler.com/?p=41#comment-84 A minor point is that North Korea may not be deterred. That's not the same about asking whether or not they could really win a war - it's whether or not they think they could win a war. That's another issue all together. Aside from all the great big pros and cons of the North Korean view of a potential war, keep in mind the example of Iraq in '91. In any sort of 'dynamic zero-defect' totalitarian state, information about the likely outcome of military action may just not get to the top. Do you wanna be the guy who has to meander into Nuclear Elvis' office and tell him that the chances of making it to the Seoul suburbs are between slim and none? Aside from that, there is a huge ideological tendency in Stalinist states to proclaim the virtue of the noble People's Army against the bankrupt capitalist mercenaries and their running-dog lackeys (yeah, I read the KCNA from time to time). These two things together, combined with the fact that NoKo has been preparing for one and only one war for the last half century means that they might think they have a shot. If nothing else, you don't allocate 10% of your manpower to special forces unless you think you've got a sneaky up your sleeve. A minor point is that North Korea may not be deterred. That’s not the same about asking whether or not they could really win a war - it’s whether or not they think they could win a war. That’s another issue all together.

Aside from all the great big pros and cons of the North Korean view of a potential war, keep in mind the example of Iraq in ‘91. In any sort of ‘dynamic zero-defect’ totalitarian state, information about the likely outcome of military action may just not get to the top. Do you wanna be the guy who has to meander into Nuclear Elvis’ office and tell him that the chances of making it to the Seoul suburbs are between slim and none?

Aside from that, there is a huge ideological tendency in Stalinist states to proclaim the virtue of the noble People’s Army against the bankrupt capitalist mercenaries and their running-dog lackeys (yeah, I read the KCNA from time to time).

These two things together, combined with the fact that NoKo has been preparing for one and only one war for the last half century means that they might think they have a shot. If nothing else, you don’t allocate 10% of your manpower to special forces unless you think you’ve got a sneaky up your sleeve.

]]> By: cliff http://www.rjkoehler.com/2003/09/03/shut-up-peanuts/#comment-83 cliff Wed, 03 Sep 2003 15:19:10 +0000 http://rjkoehler.com/?p=41#comment-83 It is a symptom of the intellectual problem of dealing with North Korea that anyone takes Carter's pathetic rants on the subject seriously enough to publish them. The simple fact is that the North Koreans will stop their nuclear program when the current regime is gone, not before, regardless of any other considerations. For the current regime, the need for nuclear weapons trumps all considerations except imminent, coerced regime change. Carter's fantasies, and those who think like him, gave us the mess we have today. His views on the subject should be treated accordingly. If we think the situation is nasty now, wait until the North Koreans have an inventory of a dozen nuclear weapons, and are even more desperate to save their hopelessly dysfunctional economy. If the Chinese, who possess the only real leverage, choose not to take some responsibility for their vile creation in NK, then the unthinkable will become the inevitable. Carter will blame Republicans. And the terrible fact is that the North Korean situation should remain a side show - they are desperate, and will collapse with a bit of a push. We need to stay focused on those who will actually use a nuke on us, if they get hold of one: the Islamists. And they have other sources, too. It is a symptom of the intellectual problem of dealing with North Korea that anyone takes Carter’s pathetic rants on the subject seriously enough to publish them. The simple fact is that the North Koreans will stop their nuclear program when the current regime is gone, not before, regardless of any other considerations. For the current regime, the need for nuclear weapons trumps all considerations except imminent, coerced regime change.

Carter’s fantasies, and those who think like him, gave us the mess we have today. His views on the subject should be treated accordingly. If we think the situation is nasty now, wait until the North Koreans have an inventory of a dozen nuclear weapons, and are even more desperate to save their hopelessly dysfunctional economy.

If the Chinese, who possess the only real leverage, choose not to take some responsibility for their vile creation in NK, then the unthinkable will become the inevitable. Carter will blame Republicans.

And the terrible fact is that the North Korean situation should remain a side show - they are desperate, and will collapse with a bit of a push. We need to stay focused on those who will actually use a nuke on us, if they get hold of one: the Islamists. And they have other sources, too.

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