You know, I used to believe Jimmy Carter was the finest ex-president in American history, but the more he says and writes stupid shit like what appeared in yesterday’s USA Today, the lower my opinion of the man becomes. Take a look at this crap (Hat tip to Kathreb - nice new look, BTW):
We face the strong possibility of another Korean war, with potentially devastating consequences, so the endangered multilateral talks in Beijing are of paramount importance. It is vital that some accommodation be reached between Pyongyang and Washington.
North Korea is an isolated country, poverty stricken, paranoid, apparently self-sacrificial and amazingly persistent in international confrontations, as is now being demonstrated. It is a cultural and almost sacred commitment for its leaders not to back down, even in the face of international condemnation and the most severe political and economic pressure.
Look - I’m with Jimmy on the “isolated,” “poverty-stricken,” “paranoid” and “persistent” part, but the North is NOT, I say NOT, “self-sacrificial.” The Stalinists who run the show in Pyongyang are not your martyr types, although they may be perfectly happy to martyr much of their own population to stay in power. These cats are not crazy - they have balls of steel, and are willing to ratchet the pressure up to the breaking point WITHOUT GOING OVER THE EDGE. In fact, this is how they make their living. And they are going to continue to make their living that way as long as other nations allow them to. Now, I’m sure when Jimmy went to Pyongyang in ‘94, Kim Il-sung regaled him with tales of how North Koreans were crazy-ass mofo’s who just don’t give a fuck, but if history is any indication, North Koreans are not suicidal, and if a war does break out on the Peninsula, it will be because the North misjudged the limit of unacceptable behavior, not because they intentionally crossed over it.
Oh, and Jimmy, while it’s true that Koreans can be a little hard-headed at times, it’s an exaggeration to talk of a “cultural and almost sacred commitment for its leaders not to back down.” Korean history is full of stubborn leaders, but it’s also full of figures who took more pragmatic courses of action when the chips were down. Besides, South Korean politicians are heirs to the very same cultural legacy, but they seem to have found a way to back down to the North Koreans on a fairly regular basis.
A previous example of this stubbornness occurred in 1968, when North Korea captured the USS Pueblo, a Navy intelligence-gathering ship. Despite the best efforts of President Lyndon Johnson to marshal international support and to prevail with economic punishment and military threats, President Kim il Sung never deviated from his basic demands, which included an embarrassing public apology from the United States for “spying” on his country. After 11 months, President Johnson accepted all the demands, and the crew was released.
Notwithstanding their abysmal economic failures and the resulting hardships of their people, North Korean leaders have never deviated from a commitment to military strength. They maintain a formidable army, with artillery and missiles able to wreak great destruction on Seoul and the northern portion of South Korea, regardless of how much punishment North Koreans might have to absorb during a U.S. attack or counterattack. The development of advanced rocketry and now a potential nuclear capability is further proof of their scientific resources.
Oh, great… more talk about how bad-ass the North Koreans are. Pyongyang must love reading stuff like this - why put in the effort to psych us out when they got Jimmy to do it for them. Anyway, for all their commitment to military strength and “scientific resources” (both of which could be better described as “misallocation of national resources”), the bottom line is that the North would lose any war that it started (or, for that matter, any war we started). This is a very important point to remember, because it does serve to limit North Korean behavior. As long as the North Koreans know they will not be attacked, they can be quite bold. The Pueblo incident is a case in point - the Johnson Administration set out to settle that crisis diplomatically, the military option was never seriously considered, and the North Koreans responded by being as obnoxious as possible. Ford did a little better after the 1976 “Axe Murder Incident”; when North Korea is confronted with the credible threat, it can behave in a more conciliatory fashion.
Avoided in 1994
There was another crisis in 1994, when Kim il Sung expelled International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and threatened to begin reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods from a nuclear power plant. The U.S. government refused to talk to North Korean leaders, and made plans for economic sanctions and a military attack. As the crisis escalated, The Carter Center was finally given reluctant permission from President Clinton for me to visit Pyongyang. A satisfactory agreement was concluded and later confirmed by both governments, with participation by South Korea, Japan and others. But neither side honored all the commitments.
Neither side honored its commitments? Cute, Jimmy. Kind of ignored the fact that the North Koreans never intended to honor them in the first place, something that would have been quite apparent had the deal you helped broker insisted on immediate inspections. I mean, come on Jimmy - waiting until the light-water reactors were completed before letting IAEA inspections kick in? Given North Korea’s previous record with this sort of thing, don’t you think that was sort of irresponsible? Satisfactory agreement, my ass - it’s no wonder the North Koreans think we’re a bunch of schmucks.
Worrisome actions
The situation is rapidly deteriorating again. North Korea feels increasingly threatened by being branded an “axis of evil” member; deployment of anti-ballistic missiles in Alaska; Washington voices expressing military threats; interception of North Korean ships; ad hominem attacks on President Kim Jong Il; condemnation of previous efforts by President Clinton and South Korean leaders to resolve issues peacefully; and U.S. refusal to negotiate directly with North Korea. America’s newly declared policies of pre-emptive war and first use of nuclear weapons also concern North Koreans.
Even before these more recent threats, the North Koreans began a secret and illicit nuclear program. They have initiated a concerted effort to develop a nuclear arsenal, with the possible production of a half-dozen weapons by the end of 2003 and similar annual numbers thereafter. These could be used by North Korea or sold to other nations or terrorist groups. This is now by far the most serious threat to regional and world peace.
Interesting rhetorical style - go though all the mean stuff Dublya has done to the poor Norkipoos, and then add, “Oh, yeah, did I mention that even before these threats began, the North Koreans were building nukes.” Jimmy, Jimmy, Jimmy… all the Bush Administration did was call the Norks on what they were doing, things the previous Administration knew they were doing and did nothing about. Granted, Bush has yet to do anything to stop them, either, but at least he’s not paying them to do it, and most importantly, he’s not paying lip-service to a Framework Agreement that was dead the moment it was signed.
There are other issues, but the basic North Korean demand is a firm non-aggression commitment from the United States, which U.S. officials continue to reject. The U.S. insists first on a complete end to the North Koreans’ nuclear program, which they have refused to accept. If neither side will yield or compromise, then an eventual military confrontation seems likely. The United States can prevail, but with terrible human casualties in both North and South Korea.
There must be verifiable assurances that prevent North Korea from becoming a threatening nuclear power, with a firm commitment that the U.S. will not attack a peaceful North Korea. This is a time for sustained and flexible diplomacy between our two governments, to give peace and economic progress a chance within a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
You know, my friend from North Carolina claims that state has some of the finest pot in the land. Clearly, however, those fields extend south to Georgia as well. Verifiable assurance? Just how are you going to go about getting those? Peace and economic progress? Not with half this Peninsula ruled by genocidal Stalinists that depend on crisis generation to survive. Look, Jimbo - I’m being a bit hard on you, which isn’t really fair, because you didn’t negotiate the Geneva Accords - for that, we have the Clinton people to blame. But let’s not continue to shovel the shit here - what you are calling for is a repeat of ‘94, which isn’t a final solution to this problem by any stretch of the imagination. Is diplomacy required? Yes. But we need hard-ball diplomacy the likes of which the Carters of this world have little to say. So Jimmy, please - it was a nice try when you guys had your chance, but you dropped the ball, and now it’s the Bush peoples’ turn to clean up the mess. Will they do a better job? I don’t know, but I’m sick of people like Jimmy and Bill Perry running their mouths off about war instead of taking responsibility for their shite agreement that allowed this mess to happen. So Jimbo - until you have something constructive to say, just shut the hell up, will ‘ya? While you still have a reputation to protect.



4 Comments
It is a symptom of the intellectual problem of dealing with North Korea that anyone takes Carter’s pathetic rants on the subject seriously enough to publish them. The simple fact is that the North Koreans will stop their nuclear program when the current regime is gone, not before, regardless of any other considerations. For the current regime, the need for nuclear weapons trumps all considerations except imminent, coerced regime change.
Carter’s fantasies, and those who think like him, gave us the mess we have today. His views on the subject should be treated accordingly. If we think the situation is nasty now, wait until the North Koreans have an inventory of a dozen nuclear weapons, and are even more desperate to save their hopelessly dysfunctional economy.
If the Chinese, who possess the only real leverage, choose not to take some responsibility for their vile creation in NK, then the unthinkable will become the inevitable. Carter will blame Republicans.
And the terrible fact is that the North Korean situation should remain a side show - they are desperate, and will collapse with a bit of a push. We need to stay focused on those who will actually use a nuke on us, if they get hold of one: the Islamists. And they have other sources, too.
A minor point is that North Korea may not be deterred. That’s not the same about asking whether or not they could really win a war - it’s whether or not they think they could win a war. That’s another issue all together.
Aside from all the great big pros and cons of the North Korean view of a potential war, keep in mind the example of Iraq in ‘91. In any sort of ‘dynamic zero-defect’ totalitarian state, information about the likely outcome of military action may just not get to the top. Do you wanna be the guy who has to meander into Nuclear Elvis’ office and tell him that the chances of making it to the Seoul suburbs are between slim and none?
Aside from that, there is a huge ideological tendency in Stalinist states to proclaim the virtue of the noble People’s Army against the bankrupt capitalist mercenaries and their running-dog lackeys (yeah, I read the KCNA from time to time).
These two things together, combined with the fact that NoKo has been preparing for one and only one war for the last half century means that they might think they have a shot. If nothing else, you don’t allocate 10% of your manpower to special forces unless you think you’ve got a sneaky up your sleeve.
No argument with anything that you’ve said - I think it was Randall Parker at Parapundit who made the analogy to 1941 Japan in order to point out that states do not always calculate their interests correctly. As you point out correctly, Iraq miscalculated its chances in 1991 - with equally disasterous results (for Baghdad, at least). However, call it gut instinct, but I don’t think the North Koreans are prepared to make the same mistake. First off, the environment is much different - in 1941, it was possible to come up with scenarios by which Japan could have won a limited victory (unlikely those scenarios might have been), and Iraq was surrounded by weak powers and counted on the Americans giving them a pass. I find it difficult for North Korea, despite “victory scenarios” available for your reading pleasure on the Internet, to conceive of a war ending in any way other than one - total defeat. Even without American support, South Korea has the capabilities to defend itself, as does Japan. Still, you are correct - the decision-making process in states such as North Korea have at time proved faulty, and sometimes you have to wonder just how much of their own propoganda the North Korean leadership believe.
I think you’ve pretty much summed it up. The whole thing that still makes me a bit skitchy on the whole deal is related, in some way to the respective ideologies.
In the west, war is viewed as a breakdown of deterrence (i.e. communication) quite often stemming from the kinds of scenarios you describe.
In Marxist-Leninist doctrine, war is seen as the inevitable outcome of class struggles and is part of the inexorable historical dialectic.
It’s that kind of basic core difference in concept that is part of why I’m spooked.
The other question I have though is what constitutes a win? I would place fairly good money on the notion that even KJI is beginning to realize that an extention of the mid-90’s status quo is an absolute total loss for North Korea. Just because there’s no shooting doesn’t mean that their not facing an existential threat. I don’t see a lot of appetizing ways out for North Korea.
Guess it kinda sucks to choose a totally bass-ackward political system.